A Practical English Auction with One-Time Registration

Omote, Kazumasa; Miyaji, Atsuko

doi:10.1007/3-540-47719-5_19

Cited by 46 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The public auction scheme proposed by Omote and Miyaji [OM01] is an efficient model of public auction in which bidders can participate in plural rounds of auction with one-time registration. In this scheme, two kind of managers are introduced.…”

Section: Omote and Miyaji's Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, [OM01] proposed an efficient model of public auction. In their scheme, two managers, registration manager (RM) and auction manager (AM), are introduced to provide the anonymity of bidder.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper is organized as follows. First, [OM01] scheme is describe briefly and its problem is discussed in Section 2. Next, cryptographic primitives such as signature of knowledge, hash chain, and Diffie-Hellman key agreement are described in Section 3.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability

B¹,

Kim²,

Ma³

2001

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract.In public auction, all bid values are published, but each bidder participates in auction protocol in anonymous way. Recently, Omote and Miyaji [OM01] proposed a new model of public auction in which any bidder can participate in plural rounds of auction with one-time registration. They have introduced two managers, registration manager (RM) and auction manager (AM), and have used efficient tools such as bulletin board and signature of knowledge [CS97].In this scheme, even if a bidder is identified as a winner in a round, he can participate in next rounds of auction maintaining anonymity for RM, AM, and any bidder. But a problem of this protocol is that the identity of winner cannot be published. In the winner announcement stage, RM informs the vendor of winner's identity secretly. Therefore RM's final role cannot be verified, and AM and any participating bidder can not be sure of the validity of auction. In this paper, we propose a new public auction scheme which can solve this problem. In the proposed scheme, both RM and AM execute randomization operation in round setup process which makes the publication of winner's identity be possible while keeping anonymity of winner in next rounds of auction. Moreover, AM provides ticket identifier based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement which is recognized only by the bidder. Our scheme provides real anonymity in plural rounds of auction with one-time registration in a verifiable way.

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Section: Omote and Miyaji's Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability

B¹,

Kim²,

Ma³

2001

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Examples include signatures of knowledge and zero-knowledge proofs [1], coin-extractability, range proofs and proofs of knowledge [2], hash chains [3], and proxy-oblivious transfers and secure evaluation functions [4]. Sako's protocol [5], explained in detail in Section 2, applies public-key encryption in a clever way to implement a verifiable sealed-bid auction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure Auctions without Cryptography

Dreier

Jonker

Lafourcade

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. An auction is a simple way of selling and buying goods. Modern auction protocols often rely on complex cryptographic operations to ensure manifold security properties such as bidder-anonymity or bid-privacy, non-repudiation, fairness or public verifiability of the result. This makes them difficult to understand for users who are not experts in cryptography. We propose two physical auction protocols inspired by Sako's cryptographic auction protocol. In contrast to Sako's protocol, they do not rely on cryptographic operations, but on physical properties of the manipulated mechanical objects to ensure the desired security properties. The first protocol only uses standard office material, whereas the second uses a special wooden box. We validate the security of our solutions using ProVerif.

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“…For example, in an English auction, buyers bid publicly against each other and the highest bid wins (e.g. [16]). A Vickrey auction is rather similar, except that the winning buyer pays the price of the second-highest bid (see e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defining verifiability in e-auction protocols

Dreier

Jonker

Lafourcade

2013

Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security

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An electronic auction protocol will only be used by those who trust that it operates correctly. Therefore, e-auction protocols must be verifiable: seller, buyer and losing bidders must all be able to determine that the result was correct. We pose that the importance of verifiability for e-auctions necessitates a formal analysis. Consequently, we identify notions of verifiability for each stakeholder. We formalize these and then use the developed framework to study the verifiability of two examples, the protocols due to Curtis et al. and Brandt, identifying several issues.

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A Practical English Auction with One-Time Registration

Cited by 46 publications

References 21 publications

Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability

Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability

Secure Auctions without Cryptography

Defining verifiability in e-auction protocols

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