A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States

Hicks, William D.; McKee, Seth C.; Sellers, Mitchell Dylan; Smith, Daniel A.

doi:10.1177/1065912914554039

Cited by 117 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…As much driven by habit as structural constraints or perception, the utilization of more ''convenient'' modes of voting may be circumscribed for many potential voters. Because convenience voting is not ''self-actuating,'' as Stein et al (2005) argue, the ability of Footnote 3 continued 2012; Herron and Smith 2014;Herron et al 2016), or have even erected new barriers-such as strict photo ID laws-due to concerns over the risk of electoral fraud (Hicks et al 2015). Notwithstanding the recent reversals on convenience voting, some scholars have argued that the very institutional expansion of convenience voting-to say nothing of the recent reversals-may actually lead to lower turnout.…”

Section: Theorizing About Reprecinctingmentioning

confidence: 96%

Reprecincting and Voting Behavior

2016

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Despite the expansion of convenience voting across the American states, millions of voters continue to cast ballots at their local precincts on Election Day. We argue that those registered voters who are reassigned to a different Election Day polling place prior to an election are less likely to turn out to vote than those assigned to vote at the same precinct location, as a new precinct location incurs both search and transportation costs on reassigned voters. Utilizing voter file data and precinct shape files from Manatee County, Florida, from before and after the 2014 General Election, we demonstrate that the redrawing of precinct boundaries and the designation of Election Day polling places is not a purely technical matter for local election administrators, but may affect voter turnout of some registered voters more than others. Controlling for a host of demographic, partisan, vote history, and geospatial factors, we find significantly lower turnout among registered voters who were reassigned to a new Election Day precinct compared to those who were not, an effect not equally offset by those voters turning to other available modes of voting (either early in-person or absentee). All else equal, we find that registered Hispanic voters were significantly more likely to abstain from voting as a result of being reassigned than any other racial group.

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Section: Theorizing About Reprecinctingmentioning

confidence: 96%

Reprecincting and Voting Behavior

2016

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“…They are more common in states with Republican legislative majorities (Rocha & Matsubayashi, ). Their passage into law is tied to partisan competition at the state level: Competitive states controlled by Republican legislatures are particularly likely to pass these laws, presumably to protect their slim electoral margins (Bentele & O'Brien, ; Hicks, McKee, Sellers, & Smith, ). In addition, these studies find that racial demographic change matters: Republican states where the non‐White electorate is growing rapidly are also much more likely to see these laws proposed and passed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why the Sky Didn't Fall: Mobilizing Anger in Reaction to Voter ID Laws

Valentino

Neuner

2016

Political Psychology

111

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Since 2002, 26 U.S. states have passed laws that enhance restrictions on voters who intend to register and vote. Most have been sponsored by Republican legislators and passed by states with large Republican majorities. Proponents of such identification requirements argue that they are necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral system by reducing voter fraud. Many Democrats have cried foul, arguing these laws are motivated by crass partisanship at best, and racial bias at worst, because they disproportionately disenfranchise minorities. Surprisingly, empirical evidence for significant demobilization, either in the aggregate or among Democrats specifically, has thus far failed to materialize. We suspect strong emotional reactions to the public debate about these laws may mobilize Democrats, counterbalancing the disenfranchising effect. We find support for this conjecture in a nationally representative survey and an experiment where news frames about voter identification (ID) laws are carefully manipulated.

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“…We largely discount the possibility that state lawmakers voting on the issue are principally motivated by legislative logrolling or rent-seeking behavior (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Rather, we expect party cohesion to be quite strong, in keeping with aggregate-level studies showing chamber votes on voter ID bills to be of the party-line variety (e.g., Bentele and O'Brien 2013;Hicks et al 2015). Our analysis draws on the final floor vote of each chamber and excludes lawmakers who abstained, voted present, were excused, or were absent during the roll call.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Similar to previous studies (Bentele and O'Brien 2013;Hicks et al 2015), 4 we examine the passage stage of voter ID legislation. We do so for several reasons.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

The Determinants of State Legislator Support for Restrictive Voter ID Laws

Hicks

McKee

Smith

2016

State Politics Policy Q.

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We examine state legislator behavior on restrictive voter identification (ID) bills from 2005 to 2013. Partisan polarization of state lawmakers on voter ID laws is well known, but we know very little with respect to other determinants driving this political division. A major shortcoming of extant research evaluating the passage of voter ID bills stems from using the state legislature as the unit of analysis. We depart from existing scholarship by using the state legislator as our unit of analysis, and we cover the entirety of the period when restrictive voter ID laws became a frequent agenda item in state legislatures. Beyond the obviously significant effect of party affiliation, we find a notable relationship between the racial composition of a member's district, region, and electoral competition and the likelihood that a state lawmaker supports a voter ID bill. Democratic lawmakers representing substantial black district populations are more opposed to restrictive voter ID laws, whereas Republican legislators with substantial black district populations are more supportive. We also find Southern lawmakers (particularly Democrats) are more opposed to restrictive voter ID legislation. In particular, we find black legislators in the South are the least supportive of restrictive voter ID bills, which is likely tied to the historical context associated with state laws restricting electoral participation. Finally, in those state legislatures where electoral competition is not intense, polarization over voter ID laws is less stark, which likely reflects the expectation that the reform will have little bearing on the outcome of state legislative contests.

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A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States

Cited by 117 publications

References 45 publications

Reprecincting and Voting Behavior

Reprecincting and Voting Behavior

Why the Sky Didn't Fall: Mobilizing Anger in Reaction to Voter ID Laws

The Determinants of State Legislator Support for Restrictive Voter ID Laws

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