No abstract

We undertake a comprehensive examination of restrictive voter ID legislation in the American states from 2001 through 2012. With a dataset containing approximately one thousand introduced and nearly one hundred adopted voter ID laws, we evaluate the likelihood that a state legislature introduces a restrictive voter ID bill, as well as the likelihood that a state government adopts such a law. Voter ID laws have evolved from a valence issue into a partisan battle, where Republicans defend them as a safeguard against fraud while Democrats indict them as a mechanism of voter suppression. However, voter ID legislation is not uniform across the states; not all Republican-controlled legislatures have pushed for more restrictive voter ID laws. Instead, our findings show it is a combination of partisan control and the electoral context that drives enactment of such measures. While the prevalence of Republican lawmakers strongly and positively influences the adoption of voter ID laws in electorally competitive states, its effect is significantly weaker in electorally uncompetitive states. Republicans preside over an electoral coalition that is declining in size; where elections are competitive, the furtherance of restrictive voter ID laws is a means of maintaining Republican support while curtailing Democratic electoral gains.

Does partisan competition explain why some legislatures are more efficient at processing legislation than others? This article argues that legislative parties' strategic incentives and capabilities are a function of their size, their ideological homogeneity, and the governor's party. It shows that the distribution of legislative seats between the parties influences legislative efficiency, depending on the level of polarization between the parties and the party of the governor. A small partisan seat margin reduces legislative efficiency when the parties are polarized and when the government is divided. It provides further evidence that polarization and divided government can either positively or negatively affect legislative efficiency, depending on the distribution of seats held between the two parties. This research contributes to the literature by demonstrating the conditional influence of political parties. Based in multilevel modeling techniques, this research also contributes to the literature with robust evidence including 48 state legislatures, through 19 years.

Objective. The proliferation of voter identification (ID) laws in the American states has spawned a growing literature examining their causes and effects. We move in a different direction, focusing on public opinion toward these laws. Methods. Drawing on a battery of questions in the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we explore why some respondents believe these laws prevent fraud while others believe they disadvantage political participation. Results. We find that partisanship shapes respondents' attitudes about the effects of voter ID laws, but in different ways. Democrats, whose opinions vary according to ideology, education, attention to politics, and racial resentment, are divided. Republicans, however, are markedly more united in their support of voter ID laws. Conclusions. These differences, we argue, are consistent with an elite-to-mass message transmission reflecting the current context of polarized party politics and the variation in the voter coalitions comprising the Democratic and Republican parties.

What is the minimum black population necessary to elect African-American state lawmakers? We offer the most comprehensive examination of the election of black state legislators in the post- Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) era. We begin by charting changes in the partisan affiliation of state legislators and the percentage of black legislators from 1971 to 2016. This descriptive assessment is undertaken according to important regional (Non-South and South) and subregional (Rim South and Deep South) contexts in American politics. We then perform multivariate analyses of the likelihood of electing black legislators across three periods following the marked increase in the creation of majority-minority districts (1993–1995, 2003–2005, 2013–2015). Because of sectional variation in the partisan strength of the major parties, the probability of achieving black representation is significantly different depending upon whether a contest occurs in the Non-South, Rim South, or Deep South, with the latter constituting of the highest threshold of black population necessary to elect an African-American. By merging an original dataset on state legislative elections with the most complete evaluation of the factors shaping the election of black lawmakers, our findings shed new light on minority representation and how sectional differences greatly affect the electoral success of African-Americans.