A Question of Expertise: the House of Lords and Welfare Policy

Abstract

The expertise of its members is often cited as one of the distinctive features of the House of Lords. In particular it is frequently argued that because of its composition, and in particular the existence of the Crossbench Peers, debates in the Lords are more informed than in the Commons. In contrast to the Commons where MPs, because of the demands of re-election and constituency business, are required to know a little about a wide range of subjects, Peers, it has been claimed bring professional experience and expertise to the scrutiny of legislation, and have the time to maintain their expertise. Moreover, the presumed expertise of the Upper House is also central to debates about the reform of the House of Lords, with assertions that any further reform should retain the Lords ability to provide distinctive and informed scrutiny.Drawing on a series of interviews with a large sample of MPs and Peers from across parliament this paper seeks to examine what is meant by parliamentary expertise by focusing on one particular policy area -welfare. It will seek to determine the nature of parliamentary expertise on welfare in both Houses and suggests that in the field of welfare the Upper House may in fact be less expert than the House of Commons.

‘A More Representative Chamber’: Representation and the House of Lords

“…25 This may mean that very large and important areas of government policy, such as education, largely go without informed scrutiny in the Lords. 26…”

Houses of Abstention or Houses of Reflection? Upper Houses in EU Member States and theEx anteScrutiny of EU Legislation

“…This similarity in composition in combination with strong party discipline decreases the chance that an Upper House -even when possessing considerable constitutional powers -will often contradict the Lower House when scrutinizing the same EU legislative proposals. In contrast, members of Upper Houses whom are appointed for life are more likely to play an independent role from the Lower House, because they have a different background and perception of their role as MP than the elected members of the Lower House (Bochel and Defty 2010). In these types of bicameral systems, chances are higher that the Upper House occasionally contradicts the Lower House when scrutinizing the same EU legislative proposals.…”

“…Hence, Upper Houses are often portrayed as Houses of reflection on or review of the decision of the Lower House (Aroney 2008, 211;Waldron 2012). This image of the Upper House as 'chambre de réflexion' is supported by work of scholars showing that Upper Houses possess specific expertise not present in the Lower House (Dorey 2009; but see Bochel and Defty 2010), are less sensitive to electoral and party pressures and operate in a less visible way for the media (Russell 2001b).…”

“…the Dutch Eerste Kamer -with a limited number of part-time MPs and staff members. The British House of Lords is an example of a full-time House, with comparable resources in terms of support staff as the Lower House (Bochel and Defty 2010). This difference between Upper Houses with regard to the time and other resources allocated to its members to scrutinize proposed legislative acts leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis on differences in parliamentary behaviour between EU member states: H1: Part-time Upper Houses are scrutinizing EU legislation in negotiation at the EU level less than full-time Upper Houses.…”

‘A More Representative Chamber’: Representation and the House of Lords

“…25 This may mean that very large and important areas of government policy, such as education, largely go without informed scrutiny in the Lords. 26 …”