A Radical Solution to the Problem of Evil

Harrison, Gerald K.

doi:10.1007/s11841-016-0526-0

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Extreme forms of voluntarism or divine command metaethics that hold that whatever God does or approves is good simply because God does or approves it (e.g. Harrison (2017) ) are unaffected, 6 as are extreme forms of mysterianism that would deny that the meaning of ‘good’ as applied to God bears any relation to our ordinary concept of goodness. The supposition that is supposed to lead to contradiction is that God is all-powerful and perfectly good and that the use here of the words ‘powerful’ and ‘good’ bears some significant relation to the usual semantic content of those words.…”

Section: Defences Against the Logical Problem Of Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil

Pearce

2019

Rel. Stud.

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This article provides a new defence against the logical problem of evil, based on the naturalistic functional/teleological theory of mind (NFT). I argue that if the NFT is self-consistent then it is consistent with theism. Further, the NFT entails that it is not possible for created minds to exist in the absence of evil. It follows that if the NFT is self-consistent then the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil.

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Section: Defences Against the Logical Problem Of Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil

Pearce

2019

Rel. Stud.

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“…Nonetheless, Harrison does suggest that however we learn the moral facts, God is, in some sense, responsible for communicating the moral facts to us. Many (though perhaps not all) naturalistic moral epistemologies will be consistent with Harrison's (2016), because the operations of nature could (perhaps) be understood as the result of God's providence.…”

Section: Harrison Skeptical Theism and Anthony Collinsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An All Too Radical Solution to the Problem of Evil: a Reply to Harrison

Linford

2017

SOPHIA

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Gerald Harrison has recently argued the evidential problem of evil can be resolved if we assume the moral facts are identical to God's commands or favorings. On a theistic metaethics, the moral facts are identical to what God commands or favors. Our moral intuitions reflect what God commands or favors for us to do, but not what God favors for Herself to do. Thus, on Harrison's view, while we can know the moral facts as they pertain to humans, we cannot know the moral facts as they pertain to God. Therefore, Harrison argues, the evidential problem of evil inappropriately assumes God to be intuitively moral, when we have no reason to suppose a perfectly good being would match the expectations provided by our moral intuitions. Harrison calls his view a new form of skeptical theism. In response, I show Harrison's attempt to dissolve the problem of evil exacerbates well-known skeptical consequences of skeptical theism. Harrison's new skeptical theism leaves us with problems motivating a substantive religious life, the inability to provide a variety of theological explanations, and, despite Harrison's comments to the contrary, worsens problems having to do with the possibility of divine deception.

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A Radical Solution to the Problem of Evil

Cited by 2 publications

References 3 publications

Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil

Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil

An All Too Radical Solution to the Problem of Evil: a Reply to Harrison

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