IntroductionThe mind is whatever is ultimately bearing our conscious experiences. Substance dualism is the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. In what follows, I am going to argue that our moral intuitions about the inherent value of our minds strongly imply that our minds are nonphysical objects.First, I will clarify what substance dualism of the kind I am seeking to support here involves. Second, I will outline a few assumptions I will be making about morality. Third, I will say something about moral intuitions. Fourth, I will present the moral argument. Finally, I will consider some objections before concluding. Substance DualismThere is no uncontroversial definition of a physical object. However, we have a pre-theoretical understanding of the concept that proposed definitions are trying, at least approximately, to capture. For instance, my mug is a physical object, and it is currently inside my house, which is also a physical object. However, there are serious limits to what my mug can be inside. It cannot be inside-wholly inside-something smaller than it or inside something solid. Yet, the kind of object our moral intuitions imply is bearing our conscious experiences is one apparently capable of existing inside any other thing at all and all by itself. So, it is a kind of object that has no size or mass. It seems no abuse of the term to describe such an I am immensely grateful to Julia Tanner and two anonymous referees at this journal who read and provided helpful comments on an earlier version. I would also like to thank Peter Meihana for a useful discussion.

Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).

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