A recursive core for partition function form games

Kóczy, László Á.

doi:10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x

Cited by 91 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In order to solve the proposed femtocell coalition formation game in partition form, we use the concept of a recursive core introduced and discussed in [16]. The recursive core is a key solution concept for coalitional games that have dependence on externalities, i.e., in partition form.…”

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The recursive core is a key solution concept for coalitional games that have dependence on externalities, i.e., in partition form. In essence, the recursive core draws a parallel with the well-known core concept of games in characteristic form [16]. The recursive core is a suitable outcome of a coalition formation process that accounts for externalities across coalitions, which, in the considered game, are represented by the mutual interference between coalitions of FAPs.…”

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, let R = N \ S denote the set of residual players. The residual game (R, v) is defined as a game in partition form over the set R. Clearly, a residual game is still in partition form and it can be solved as an independent game, regardless of how it was generated as discussed in [16]. To better present this concept, we will provide an intuitive introduction.…”

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is worth stressing that the recursive core verifies the properties of rationality, welldefinition and efficiency [16]. In detail, with rationality it is intended that players never choose an inferior (i.e., dominated) strategy, therefore, they always pursue a profitable strategy.…”

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperative Interference Alignment in Femtocell Networks

Pantisano¹,

Bennis²,

Saad

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2011

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Abstract-Underlay femtocells have recently emerged as a key technology that can significantly improve the coverage and performance of next-generation wireless networks. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for interference management that enables a number of femtocells to cooperate and improve their downlink rate, by sharing spectral resources and suppressing intra-tier interference using interference alignment. We formulate a coalitional game in partition form among the femtocells and propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Using our approach, the femtocell access points can make individual decisions on whether to cooperate or not, while maximizing a utility function that captures the cooperative gains and the costs in terms of transmit power for information exchange. We show that, using the proposed coalition formation algorithm, the femtocells can self-organize into a network partition composed of disjoint femtocell coalitions, which constitutes the recursive core of the game. Simulation results show significant gains in terms of average payoff per femtocell, reaching up to 30% relative to the non-cooperative scheme.

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Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Recursive Corementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Cooperative Interference Alignment in Femtocell Networks

Pantisano¹,

Bennis²,

Saad

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2011

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“…Other behavioral models for the non-deviators have also been proposed in the context of partition function games, where the value of a coalition depends on how the remaining people react to a deviation, see e.g. [17][Section 3.1] for a summary on this. But clearly, as pointed out in [14], there is no universally correct answer on modeling how the non-deviators react.…”

Section: Cournot Coalition Formation Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies

Immorlica

Markakis

Piliouras

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the negative externalities they impose on each other. Such behaviors generally lead to inefficient outcomes where the social welfare is bounded away from its optimal value. However, in practice, self-interested individuals explore the possibility of circumventing such negative externalities by forming coalitions. What sort of coalitions should we expect to arise? How do they affect the social welfare?We study these questions in the setting of Cournot markets, one of the most prevalent models of firm competition. Our model of coalition formation has two dynamic aspects. First, agents choose strategically how to update the current coalition partition. Furthermore, coalitions compete repeatedly between themselves trying to minimize their long-term regret. We prove tight bounds on the social welfare, which are significantly higher than that of the Nash equilibria of the original game. Furthermore, this improvement in performance is robust across different supply-demand curves and depends only on the size of the market.

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