2020
DOI: 10.3390/info11010048
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A Revision of the Buechner–Tavani Model of Digital Trust and a Philosophical Problem It Raises for Social Robotics

Abstract: In this paper the Buechner–Tavani model of digital trust is revised—new conditions for self-trust are incorporated into the model. These new conditions raise several philosophical problems concerning the idea of a substantial self for social robotics, which are closely examined. I conclude that reductionism about the self is incompatible with, while the idea of a substantial self is compatible with, trust relations between human agents, between human agents and artificial agents, and between artificial agents.

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“…Digital trust is a relational construct (Buechner, 2020) in which the practitioners involved have sufficient willingness to be vulnerable to a technology (Lippert, 2007). For instance, the driver of a car trust the digital adaptive cruise control systems when driving at the highway.…”
Section: The Nature Of Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Digital trust is a relational construct (Buechner, 2020) in which the practitioners involved have sufficient willingness to be vulnerable to a technology (Lippert, 2007). For instance, the driver of a car trust the digital adaptive cruise control systems when driving at the highway.…”
Section: The Nature Of Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%