A ‘revisiting’ of the comparison between ‘Continental Law’ and ‘English Law’ (16th‐19th Century)

Gorla, Gino; Moccia, Luigi

doi:10.1080/01440368108530737

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Some of the differences were surely sharpened, or even created, by the English and the French Revolutions. For example, judges looked to past judicial decisions for centuries in both England and France prior to the revolutions (Gorla and Moccia 1981). However, the explicit reliance on precedent as a source of law (and the term precedent itself) is only a 17 th and 18 th century development in England (Berman 2003).…”

Section: Medieval Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins

Porta¹,

López-de-Silanes

Shleifer

2008

Journal of Economic Literature

2,716

1,376

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In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.

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Section: Medieval Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins

Porta¹,

López-de-Silanes

Shleifer

2008

Journal of Economic Literature

2,716

1,376

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…It has been claimed that both the lack of practice and these doctrinal influences made Continental judges more resistant to capitalist wealth accumulation and hindered their understanding of market transactions. Although judges in the higher courts were generally recruited from the ranks of the most eminent practicing lawyers (Gorla and Moccia, 1981), French judges, for example, like other nobles under the ancient regime, received their income from land, urban property, venal office and annuities. Furthermore, they despised the considerable risk exposure of merchants, merchant manufacturers and bankers whose sources of income were incompatible with the nobility status (Bluche, 1960).…”

Section: The Conscious Design Of Modern Civil Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judges' Cognition and Market Order

Arruñada

Andonova

2008

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

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We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion in both legal traditions were thus adapted to different circumstances, mainly the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The long-term confluence of both branches of the Western legal system towards lesser freedom of contract is explained as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system. These favored the adoption of sharing solutions that interfered with market-supporting institutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

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