A role for right medial prefrontal cortex in accurate feeling-of-knowing judgments: evidence from patients with lesions to frontal cortex

Schnyer, David M.; Verfaellie, Mieke; Alexander, Michael P.; Lafleche, Ginette; Nicholls, Lindsay; Kaszniak, Alfred W.

doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.11.020

Cited by 163 publications

(154 citation statements)

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“…This finding bolsters previous evidence for the notion that metacognitive skill in one domain may not necessarily translate to another (David et al, 2012;Metcalfe et al, 2012;Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005;Schnyer et al, 2004). Furthermore, our results indicate that metacognitive accuracy in each domain was related to regional differences of white matter microstructure.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Baird

Cieslak

Smallwood

et al. 2015

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

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Abstract■ The neural mechanisms that mediate metacognitive ability (the capacity to accurately reflect on oneʼs own cognition and experience) remain poorly understood. An important question is whether metacognitive capacity is a domain-general skill supported by a core neuroanatomical substrate or whether regionally specific neural structures underlie accurate reflection in different cognitive domains. Providing preliminary support for the latter possibility, recent findings have shown that individual differences in metacognitive ability in the domains of memory and perception are related to variation in distinct gray matter volume and resting-state functional connectivity. The current investigation sought to build on these findings by evaluating how metacognitive ability in these domains is related to variation in white matter microstructure. We quantified metacognitive ability across memory and perception domains and used diffusion spectrum imaging to examine the relation between high-resolution measurements of white matter microstructure and individual differences in metacognitive accuracy in each domain. We found that metacognitive accuracy for perceptual decisions and memory were uncorrelated across individuals and that metacognitive accuracy in each domain was related to variation in white matter microstructure in distinct brain areas. Metacognitive accuracy for perceptual decisions was associated with increased diffusion anisotropy in white matter underlying the ACC, whereas metacognitive accuracy for memory retrieval was associated with increased diffusion anisotropy in the white matter extending into the inferior parietal lobule. Together, these results extend previous findings linking metacognitive ability in the domains of perception and memory to variation in distinct brain structures and connections. ■

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Baird

Cieslak

Smallwood

et al. 2015

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

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“…Although patients with damage to the VMPFC, compared to controls, demonstrate impaired FOK accuracy, the accuracy of their retrospective confidence judgments remains intact (Schnyer et al, 2004). The authors note that the VMPFC could be specifically implicated in FOK processes because of its role in integrating output from the medial temporal lobe.…”

Section: Metacognitive Confidence In Memory Processesmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…In sum, memory-related certainty processes have been linked relatively consistently with prefrontal regions that include the DLPFC (Henson et al, 2000;Kim & Cabeza, 2007) and medial PFC (Chua et al, 2006: Schnyer et al, 2005Schnyer et al, 2004). Such activations make sense particularly in light of theories in neuroscience that propose the DLPFC is important in memory encoding and retrieval generally (Rugg, Otten, & Henson, 2002;Yonelinas, 2002) and that the MPFC is particularly sensitive to introspection and selfrelevant processing (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011;Johnson et al, 2002).…”

Section: Metacognitive Confidence In Memory Processesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Metacognitive confidence: A neuroscience approach

Luttrell

Briñol

Petty

et al. 2013

Revista de Psicología Social

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El acceso a la versión del editor puede requerir la suscripción del recurso Access to the published version may require subscription Metacognition refers to thoughts about our own thoughts or thought processes and implies a distinction between primary and secondary cognition (Dulonsky & Metcalfe, 2009). Primary thoughts are those that occur at a direct level of cognition and involve our initial associations of an object with some attribute, such as "I choose that product" or "I would like to sit down here with you." These primary cognitions are also called "object level" thoughts (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990). Following a primary thought, people can also generate other thoughts that occur at a second level. These thoughts involve reflections on the first level thoughts (e.g., "Do I really want to make that choice?" or "I am not so sure how much I would like to sit down here.").Among other things, secondary thoughts are important because they can magnify, attenuate, or even reverse the impact of first order cognitions. As noted recently by Briñol and DeMarree (2012), metacognition has assumed a prominent role in understanding social evaluations, decisions, as well as identity, and interpersonal interactions. In the present article, we review some of the work relevant for understanding how metacognition operates in the brain.There are several dimensions on which metacognitions can vary. For example, Petty, Briñol, Tormala, and Wegener (2007) suggested that people can think about their thoughts in terms of a variety of dimensions such as valence, number, target, origin, evaluation, and confidence. For example, two individuals might have the same thought but one believes that the thought stemmed from their own brains whereas another believes the thought reflects someone else's views. In another classic taxonomy, Dunlosky and Metcalfe (2009) classify metacognitions into three primary types: metacognitive knowledge (people's naïve theories about their thinking), monitoring (evaluating the appropriateness of one's own thoughts), and control (regulation on the thoughts). For example, students' perceptions that they "know" information for a test (over and above student's actual knowledge of the material) can regulate people's behavior (e.g., by discontinuing studying for a test on the target material; Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970).We begin this article by reviewing how neuroscience has dealt with the distinction between first and second-order cognition. Although we will refer to different types of metacognitions throughout, we will focus our attention on metacognitive confidence. Thus, the second part of the chapter describes the importance of considering metacognitive confidence because it affects whether people use their primary cognitions in guiding judgments and behaviors. The research described in that section is organized around the type of primary thoughts for which people have confidence, including judgments about memory, choices, and evaluative judgments. Primary vs. Secondary CognitionAs just noted, a numb...

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“…Interestingly, although participants cannot recall the target item at the time of the judgment, they can predict rather accurately whether they will later be able to recognize the answer. Several researchers have investigated the relations among various metacognitive judgments, such as FOKs, JOLs, and confidence judgments (about whether or not a person was correct in his or her recall, for example; see Bacon et al, 1998;Costermans, Lories, & Ansay, 1992;Nelson, 1984;Roy-Byrne et al, 1987;Schnyer et al, 2004). The conclusion has been (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990) that these judgments are typically not correlated with one another and, furthermore, that a person who is good at (or impaired on) one type of judgment is not necessarily good at (or impaired on) another.…”

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confidence: 99%

Judgments of learning: Evidence for a two-stage process

Son

Metcalfe

2005

Memory & Cognition

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The question addressed in this article is this: How do people make judgments of learning? Judgments of learning (JOLs) are assessments that people make about how well they have learned particular information-that is, predictions about how likely they will be to remember a target item when later given a cue. These assessments are then, presumably, used to control further study (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998;Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998;Mazzoni, Cornoldi, & Marchitelli, 1990;Metcalfe, 2002;Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003;Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991;Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994;Nelson & Narens, 1990Son, 2004;Son & Metcalfe, 2000). For example, Nelson and Dunlosky argued that "the accuracy of JOLs is critical, because if the JOLs are inaccurate, the allocation of subsequent study time will correspondingly be less than optimal" (p. 267). Because their role in learning is crucial, understanding the mechanisms underlying these judgments is central to understanding people's control of their own mental processes and for finding ways to ameliorate those processes. We will argue here that JOLs made at a delay are based on two distinct processes rather than on only the single retrieval process that previous researchers have emphasized. If so, then understanding both of those processes, and the pitfalls therein, may be pivotal to improving people's performance. In this article, we provide data that challenge the assumption that delayed JOLs are made only by an assessment of retrieval goodness or fluency. We argue and provide evidence that JOLs, like other metacognitive judgments, instead may involve two distinct stages: (1) a quick preretrieval stage based, perhaps, on cue familiarity, which determines whether or not the second stage-retrieval-will occur, and (2) a later stage in which the judgments are based on an assessment of the goodness and/or fluency of retrieval or on other aspects of the target that can become apparent once retrieval has been attempted.In the typical delayed-JOL paradigm that we investigated, participants studied cue-target pairs. Following study, they were presented with only the cue and were asked to judge how confident they were that they would be able to remember the target when they were given the cue on a future memory test. Then, at some later time, they were given a test. The prevailing view of how such JOLs are made is that when given the cue, people try to retrieve the target and base their judgments on their perception of some of the qualities of that attempted retrieval of the target, such as how quickly, easily, or fluently it comes to mind, or on how replete the retrieved information is (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989;Benjamin et al., 1998;Dunlosky, Rawson, & McDonald, 2002;Kelley & Lindsay, 1993;Maki, 1998;Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991;Nelson & Narens, 1990;Nelson, Narens, & Dunlosky, 2004;Spellman & Bjork, 1992;. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people make judgments of learning (JOLs) by attempting to retrieve the target first. If this were the whole story, then ...

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A role for right medial prefrontal cortex in accurate feeling-of-knowing judgments: evidence from patients with lesions to frontal cortex

Cited by 163 publications

References 30 publications

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Regional White Matter Variation Associated with Domain-specific Metacognitive Accuracy

Metacognitive confidence: A neuroscience approach

Judgments of learning: Evidence for a two-stage process

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