A 2-system framework is proposed for understanding the processes that enable--and undermine--self-control or "willpower" as exemplified in the delay of gratification paradigm. A cool, cognitive "know" system and a hot, emotional "go" system are postulated. The cool system is cognitive, emotionally neutral, contemplative, flexible, integrated, coherent, spatiotemporal, slow, episodic, and strategic. It is the seat of self-regulation and self-control. The hot system is the basis of emotionality, fears as well as passions--impulsive and reflexive--initially controlled by innate releasing stimuli (and, thus, literally under "stimulus control"): it is fundamental for emotional (classical) conditioning and undermines efforts at self-control. The balance between the hot and cool systems is determined by stress, developmental level, and the individual's self-regulatory dynamics. The interactions between these systems allow explanation of findings on willpower from 3 decades of research.

People's metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects' expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance, especially on insight problems; (3)normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects' own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4)the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects' feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course ofsolving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically demonstrated here, be used to define insight.

A recent study found that, across individuals, gray matter volume in the frontal polar region was correlated with visual metacognition capacity (i.e., how well one’s confidence ratings distinguish between correct and incorrect judgments). A question arises as to whether the putative metacognitive mechanisms in this region are also used in other metacognitive tasks involving, for example, memory. A novel psychophysical measure allowed us to assess metacognitive efficiency separately in a visual and a memory task, while taking variations in basic task performance capacity into account. We found that, across individuals, metacognitive efficiencies positively correlated between the two tasks. However, voxel-based morphometry analysis revealed distinct brain structures for the two kinds of metacognition. Replicating a previous finding, variation in visual metacognitive efficiency was correlated with volume of frontal polar regions. However, variation in memory metacognitive efficiency was correlated with volume of the precuneus. There was also a weak correlation between visual metacognitive efficiency and precuneus volume, which may account for the behavioral correlation between visual and memory metacognition (i.e., the precuneus may contain common mechanisms for both types of metacognition). However, we also found that gray matter volumes of the frontal polar and precuneus regions themselves correlated across individuals, and a formal model comparison analysis suggested that this structural covariation was sufficient to account for the behavioral correlation of metacognition in the two tasks. These results highlight the importance of the precuneus in higher-order memory processing and suggest that there may be functionally distinct metacognitive systems in the human brain.

No abstract

The issue of how people use their metacognitive judgments about what they know and how well they know it to take control over their own learning is of primary concern in this article. The fact that in many situations people have relatively accurate metacognitions is well documented (Brown, 1978;, 1997 Gnmeberg & Monks, 1974; Jacoby, Bjork, & Kelley, 1993;Johnson, 1988;Johnson & Raye, 1981;King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980;Koriat, 1975Koriat, , 1993Koriat, , 1995Koriat, , 1997Koriat, , 1998Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996, 1998Leonesio & Nelson, 1990;Lovelace, 1984; Mazzoni, Cornoldi, Tomat, & Vecchi, 1997;Mazzoni & Nelson, 1995;Metcalfe, 1986aMetcalfe, , 1986b Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaqnim, 1993;Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987;Nelson, 1988;Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991Nelson, Leonesio, Landwehr, & Narens, 1986;Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994;Schwartz & Smith, 1997;Smith, Brown, & Balfour, 1991;Thiede & Dunlosky, 1994; Vesonder & Voss, 1985; Wldner & Smith, 1996;Widner, Smith, & Graziano, 1996). Ease-of-learning judgments (EeLs; Underwood, 1966), feeling-of-knowing judgments (FIGs;Hart, 1965;Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr, & Narens, 1982), and judgments of difficulty (JODs) or of learning (JOLs; Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969;Gardiner & Klee, 1976;Groninger, 1979;King et al., 1980;Lovelace, 1984) generally have been shown to predict subsequent memory performance with above-chance accuracy. Having established that Lisa K. Son and Janet Metcalfe, Department of Psychology, Columbia University.This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grant 48066. We would like to thank Ozlem Ayduk, Brady Butterfield, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, Jasia Pietrzak, and Lisa Schwartz for their help. We also appreciate the comments of Thomas O. Nelson, Keith Thiede, and an anonymous reviewer on a draft of this article.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lisa K. Son, Department of Psychology, 406 Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027. Electronic mail may be sent to son@psych.columbia.edu. people appear to have access to accurate metalmowledge, the question of how they put that knowledge to use is becoming focal.Some theories indicate that metacognitions play a central role in a variety of cognitive tasks, including memory retrieval (Reder, 1987;Reder & Ritter, 1992), initial memory encoding (Metcalfe, 1993), problem solving (Metcalfe, 1986b;Simon & Newell, 1971), and self-directed learning . As was assumed by early researchers such as Flavell (1979) and Flavell and Wellman (1977), these self-reflective processes are crucial in controlling and guiding human cognition (see Metcalfe, 1996, in press, for review). Recently, investigators have begun intensively and systematically to explore the question of primary interest in this article: How do people use these metacognitive judgments to control their study-time allocation and hence to determine what it is that they will learn?Interest in the control functions of people's metacognitions was fostered by a framework for human metacognition forw...