A recent study found that, across individuals, gray matter volume in the frontal polar region was correlated with visual metacognition capacity (i.e., how well one’s confidence ratings distinguish between correct and incorrect judgments). A question arises as to whether the putative metacognitive mechanisms in this region are also used in other metacognitive tasks involving, for example, memory. A novel psychophysical measure allowed us to assess metacognitive efficiency separately in a visual and a memory task, while taking variations in basic task performance capacity into account. We found that, across individuals, metacognitive efficiencies positively correlated between the two tasks. However, voxel-based morphometry analysis revealed distinct brain structures for the two kinds of metacognition. Replicating a previous finding, variation in visual metacognitive efficiency was correlated with volume of frontal polar regions. However, variation in memory metacognitive efficiency was correlated with volume of the precuneus. There was also a weak correlation between visual metacognitive efficiency and precuneus volume, which may account for the behavioral correlation between visual and memory metacognition (i.e., the precuneus may contain common mechanisms for both types of metacognition). However, we also found that gray matter volumes of the frontal polar and precuneus regions themselves correlated across individuals, and a formal model comparison analysis suggested that this structural covariation was sufficient to account for the behavioral correlation of metacognition in the two tasks. These results highlight the importance of the precuneus in higher-order memory processing and suggest that there may be functionally distinct metacognitive systems in the human brain.

We live in a continuous environment in which the visual scene changes on a slow timescale. It has been shown that, to exploit such environmental stability, the brain creates a “continuity field” such that objects seen seconds ago influence the perception of current objects. What is unknown is whether a similar mechanism exists at the level of our metacognitive representations. In three experiments we demonstrate a robust inter-task “confidence leak” that cannot be explained by response priming or attentional fluctuations. Observers’ ability to modulate this confidence leak predicted higher capacity for metacognition as well as greater gray matter volume in the prefrontal cortex. A model based on normative principles from Bayesian inference explained the results by postulating that observers subjectively estimate the perceptual signal strength in a stable environment. These results point to the existence of a novel metacognitive mechanism mediated by regions in prefrontal cortex.

SUMMARY Little is known about how animals integrate multiple sensory inputs in natural environments to balance avoidance of danger with approach to things of value. Furthermore, the mechanistic link between internal physiological state and threat-reward decision making remains poorly understood. Here we confronted C. elegans worms with the decision whether to cross a hyperosmotic barrier presenting the threat of desiccation to reach a source of food odor. We identified a specific interneuron that controls this decision via top-down extrasynaptic aminergic potentiation of the primary osmosensory neurons to increase their sensitivity to the barrier. We also establish that food deprivation increases the worm’s willingness to cross the dangerous barrier by suppressing this pathway. These studies reveal a potentially general neural circuit architecture for internal state control of threat-reward decision making.

Animals form and update learned associations between otherwise neutral sensory cues and aversive outcomes (i.e., punishment) to predict and avoid danger in changing environments. When a cue later occurs without punishment, this unexpected omission of aversive outcome is encoded as reward via activation of reward-encoding dopaminergic neurons. How such activation occurs remains unknown. Using real-time in vivo functional imaging, optogenetics, behavioral analysis and synaptic reconstruction from electron microscopy data, we identify the neural circuit mechanism through which Drosophila reward-encoding dopaminergic neurons are activated when an olfactory cue is unexpectedly no longer paired with electric shock punishment. Reduced activation of punishment-encoding dopaminergic neurons relieves depression of olfactory synaptic inputs to cholinergic neurons. Synaptic excitation by these cholinergic neurons of reward-encoding dopaminergic neurons increases their odor response, thus decreasing aversiveness of the odor. These studies reveal how an excitatory cholinergic relay from punishment- to reward-encoding dopaminergic neurons encodes the absence of punishment as reward, revealing a general circuit motif for updating aversive memories that could be present in mammals.

Feeding decisions are fundamental to survival, and decision making is often disrupted in disease. Here, we show that neural activity in a small population of neurons projecting to the fan-shaped body higher-order central brain region of Drosophila represents food choice during sensory conflict. We found that food deprived flies made tradeoffs between appetitive and aversive values of food. We identified an upstream neuropeptidergic and dopaminergic network that relays internal state and other decision-relevant information to a specific subset of fan-shaped body neurons. These neurons were strongly inhibited by the taste of the rejected food choice, suggesting that they encode behavioral food choice. Our findings reveal that fan-shaped body taste responses to food choices are determined not only by taste quality, but also by previous experience (including choice outcome) and hunger state, which are integrated in the fan-shaped body to encode the decision before relay to downstream motor circuits for behavioral implementation.