We study how the distributions of CEO talent and compensation vary across industries, and how product market characteristics affect these distributions. We develop a market equilibrium model that incorporates the competitive assignment of CEOs to firms in a framework in which firms engage in imperfect product market-specifically, monopolistic-competition. We use the model to address the following principal research questions: (i) How important is managerial talent when the product market environment in which firms operate is considered? (ii) How do product market characteristics, such as the entry cost and the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products, affect CEO compensation? (iii) How does the distribution of CEO talent vary across industries? (iv) To what extent can product market characteristics explain the wide variation in the levels and distributions of CEO compensation across industries?Using the distributions of CEO pay and firm value in each of twelve Fama-French industries, we calibrate the parameters of our structural model, and indirectly infer the unobserved distributions of CEO talent and firm quality that together determine firm output. We then conduct several counterfactual experiments using the calibrated models corresponding to each of the industries. We find that the distribution of CEO talent does, indeed, vary dramatically across industries. More importantly, contrary to the conclusions of earlier studies that abstract away from the effects of the product market (Terviö, 2008 andGabaix andLandier, 2008), the impact of CEO talent on firm value appears to be quite significant. Our estimates of the effect of CEO talent on firm value for the industries in our sample are two orders of magnitude higher than those obtained by the aforementioned studies. Further, our estimates suggest that the compensation of CEOs is quantitatively in line with their contributions to firms. Broadly, our study shows that it is important to incorporate the product market environment in which firms operate when assessing the contributions of CEOs to firms. JEL Classification: D43, D59, G30, J24, J31, L11, L13, M52