A Secure Communication Framework for ECUs

Siddiqui, Ali Shuja; Gui, Yutian; Plusquellic, Jim; Saqib, Fareena

doi:10.25046/aj0203165

Cited by 12 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Many potential security solutions would introduce additional overhead in both computation and the number of additional messages that must be sent in support of the normal transmission of data [38] [20] [31]. Furthermore, some solutions would likely require the addition of hardware for features such as secure key storage and generation, data encryption, etc.…”

Section: Our Vision For Puf-based Low Overhead Smart Car Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The security holes present in the CAN protocol have led to led researchers to propose a variety of different possible solutions. These approaches tend to involve adding security features through either changes to the base CAN protocol itself [12] [30] [1] or proposing frameworks around the existing protocol (such the one we are proposing) so that the CAN protocol itself remains the same [38] [20] [31]. To the best of our knowledge, there are not many proposed security solutions that explicitly integrate PUFs as a core component of the system.…”

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A separate work also uses a PUF and server based approach in which the server and each ECU have an integrated PUF [31]. During authentication, the server and each ECU generate ECDH key pairs from responses generated by each PUF.…”

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The scalability issue lies with the authentication phase. Each valid ECU must receive encrypted copies of the public keys for all Operation Phase [31] Proposed…”

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The use of PRESENT for encryption allows an entire encrypted message to fit within the data field of a single CAN frame during normal communication between ECUs. Table 1 shows a comparison between [31] and our proposed framework in terms of the total number of CAN frames that must be sent during the different phases of operation within a system containing 𝑛 ECUs. The table shows that our approach scales much better for larger systems.…”

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fortifying Vehicular Security Through Low Overhead Physically Unclonable Functions

Labrado¹,

Thapliyal²,

Mohanty³

2021

Preprint

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Within vehicles, the Controller Area Network (CAN) allows efficient communication between the electronic control units (ECUs) responsible for controlling the various subsystems. The CAN protocol was not designed to include much support for secure communication. The fact that so many critical systems can be accessed through an insecure communication network presents a major security concern. Adding security features to CAN is difficult due to the limited resources available to the individual ECUs and the costs that would be associated with adding the necessary hardware to support any additional security operations without overly degrading the performance of standard communication. Replacing the protocol is another option, but it is subject to many of the same problems. The lack of security becomes even more concerning as vehicles continue to adopt smart features. Smart vehicles have a multitude of communication interfaces would an attacker could exploit to gain access to the networks. In this work we propose a security framework that is based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) and lightweight cryptography (LWC). The framework does not require any modification to the standard CAN protocol while also minimizing the amount of additional message overhead required for its operation. The improvements in our proposed framework results in major reduction in the number of CAN frames that must be sent during operation. For a system with 20 ECUs for example, our proposed framework only requires 6.5% of the number of CAN frames that is required by the existing approach to successfully authenticate every ECU. CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Hardware-based security protocols; Embedded systems security; • Computer systems organization → Embedded systems.

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Section: Our Vision For Puf-based Low Overhead Smart Car Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The scalability issue lies with the authentication phase. Each valid ECU must receive encrypted copies of the public keys for all Operation Phase [31] Proposed…”

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Comparison To Existing Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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