A Secure M + 1st Price Auction Protocol Based on Bit Slice Circuits

Publicly Verifiable M + 1st-Price Auction Fit for IoT with Minimum Storage

“…Bidders can only choose one bid from this pricing list. Many related research studies [7,8] have a similar design such that the time or communication complexity is related to the length of the bidding price list P. To solve this problem, Mitsunaga et al [9] proposed a scheme that uses a binary format to represent bidding vectors. is improvement reduced the time complexity to log P. In this research, instead of further improving complexity, we focus on removing the trusted parties, such as manager and mix servers.…”

“…Based on Abe and Suzuki's scheme [6], we removed TTP by letting bidders collaboratively act as managers and mix servers. is strategy can also be used in follow-up research studies [7][8][9]. In our preliminary version of [10], we construct a verifiable M + 1st-price auction without manager.…”

“…Mix and match [5] is widely used in auction protocols such as bit-slice-based auction [9,11,12] as well as [6] to verify if each encrypted bit is either E(0) or E (1). Mix and match can be divided into mix phase and match phase.…”

“…(a) No mix and match protocol in bid verification: our protocol does not rely on mix and match unlike [6,9,11,12]. Our new approach can also be used on bit-slice-based auction protocols [9,11,12] and all other auction protocols, which is based on encrypted bits.…”

“…(a) No mix and match protocol in bid verification: our protocol does not rely on mix and match unlike [6,9,11,12]. Our new approach can also be used on bit-slice-based auction protocols [9,11,12] and all other auction protocols, which is based on encrypted bits. (b) No TTP: in the M + 1st-price decision phase, we modify mix and match by letting bidders act as mix servers, and thus no trusted mix server is used.…”