A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence

Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter‐Ebmer, Rudolf

doi:10.2139/ssrn.144408

Cited by 138 publications

(167 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

160

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Centralized punishment can even be effective if it is not deterrent (Engel 2013). Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter, and Winter-Ebmer (2000) showed that an exogenously given tax-subsidy mechanism induces people to cooperate in line with theoretical predictions about how the incentives should work. Another line of research, dating back to a seminal paper by Toshio Yamagishi (1986) showed that people are also willing to contribute to a "punishment fund" (think of funding law enforcement through people's taxes) to punish lowest contributors.…”

Section: The Determinants Of Social Order Iii: Punishment and Other Imentioning

confidence: 71%

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Gächter¹

2014

The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis chapter presents some insights from basic behavioural research on the role of human pro-social motivation to maintain social order. I argue that social order can be conceptualised as a public good game. Past attempts to explain social order typically relied on the assumption of selfish and rational agents ("homo economicus"). The last twenty years of research in behavioural and experimental economics have challenged this view. After presenting the most important findings of recent research on human pro-sociality I discuss the evidence on three pillars of the maintenance of social order. The first pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the behaviour of other people who typically are "conditional cooperators" willing to cooperate if others do so as well. This motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere threat without being executed much. The chapter also presents some evidence on the cross-cultural variability of some findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research.

show abstract

Section: The Determinants Of Social Order Iii: Punishment and Other Imentioning

confidence: 71%

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Gächter¹

2014

The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…3 As an anecdote, I wrote an software module for an experimental software implementing a mechanism in public good experiments (Falkinger et al, 2000). Since the researchers wanted to have a lot of flexibility in the information conditions, I had to program a dialog with more than 80 checkboxes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

Fischbacher¹

2007

Exp Econ

8,564

4,647

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This contrasts with, for example, money demand studies, for which unambiguous data are available on an euro area level only as of January 1999. 3 Second, the model has been used as a workhorse for many policy discussions and applied to a large number of countries so that it has proven its ability in applied policy analysis and is well known in the profession. Finally, our choice to use this nutshell model is guided by the objective of this paper, namely to study the term structure in a macroeconomic context characterised by substantial structural institutional change.…”

Section: Modelling the Term Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Lucas Critique in Practice: An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of European Monetary Integration on the Term Structure

Bergeijk¹,

Berk

2001

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Summary An empirical investigation of the term structure (the relation of the long interest rate to the short interest rate) showed structural change as the deadline for the euro became closer. Our empirical analysis of the term structures (yield curves) in 12 OECD countries uncovers that econometrically estimated behavioural equations for most EMU countries were stable even in the light of the creation of the euro. This finding would seem to defy the Lucas Critique. However, the significant structural instability found for the euro area's core country Germany suggests that the Lucas Critique is relevant in the analysis of the impact of the creation (and future extensions) of EMU.

show abstract

A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence

Cited by 138 publications

References 46 publications

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

The Lucas Critique in Practice: An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of European Monetary Integration on the Term Structure

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About