2018
DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2018004
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A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption

Abstract: In this paper we show several results regarding to the classical cost sharing problem when each agent requires a set of services but they can share the benefits of one unit of each service, i.e. there is non rival consumption. Specifically, we show a characterized solution for this problem, mainly adapting the well-known axioms that characterize the Shapley value for TU-games into our context. Finally, we present some additional properties that the shown solution satisfy.

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Cited by 3 publications
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