A Spatial Analysis of the Italian Second Republic

Landi, Massimiliano; Pelizzo, Riccardo

doi:10.1080/13572334.2013.812342

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Often used interchangeably, cohesion and discipline are observationally equivalent but theoretically distinct concepts (Cox ; Hazan ; Krehbiel ; Özbudun ). Second, Rice scores fail to account for absences and abstentions, which may bias the results (Hix, Noury, and Roland ; Landi and Pelizzo ). Finally, Desposato () illustrates that Rice scores can be biased when calculated for small groups and proposes an alternative measure that corrects for this bias.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cross‐National Analysis of Party Switching

O’Brien

Shomer

2013

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Though instances of party switching have been widely documented, there is little cross‐national research on this phenomenon. The prevalence of switching is therefore unknown, and the factors influencing this behavior remain unclear. Using the most comprehensive dataset on party switching ever constructed, we illustrate both that interparty movement is more common than previously assumed and that there are substantial differences in its prevalence across parties. To explain this variation, we examine the relationship between legislators' motivations, institutional arrangements, and switching. We find that motivational explanations are correlated with interparty movement and that institutional arrangements exhibit only limited direct influence on switching.

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confidence: 99%

A Cross‐National Analysis of Party Switching

O’Brien

Shomer

2013

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…Hence we need dZ1Àð2npÞ À1=2 . Landi and Sodini (2011) show there are no other corner equilibria. & Lemma 1.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In addition comparative statics is easier done on the parameter governing the cost distribution. In a companion paper (Landi and Sodini, 2011) we characterize the equilibria of the static game for single peaked cost distributions.…”

Section: The Static Turnout Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens

Landi

Sodini

2012

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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a b s t r a c tWe propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, and the groups' composition are also done.

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“…Some have demonstrated that the likelihood of switches is strongly dependent on the structure of constraints and opportunities and that politicians opt for this path, whenever it is more convenient, according to their personal policy motivations and ambitions (Di Virgili, Daniela, and Luca ; Heller and Mershon ; O'Brien and Shomer ). Landi and Pelizzo () have shown that the more party competition becomes institutionalized, the more party switching decreases.…”

Section: The Units Of the Framework: Political Parties And Intra‐partmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

Vercesi

2016

Politics & Policy

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Inter-party conflict management is a typical coalitional problem in parliamentary governments. To study how and why conflicts in coalitions emerge and how parties cope with them can enhance our knowledge of coalition governance. Here, I propose a framework for comparative studies on the topic. The framework is based on the conception of coalition politics as politics of exchange. It looks at interparty interactions, but also accounts for the impact of intra-party politics. Moreover, I provide a classification of inter-party conflicts in coalitions and point out when they are more likely. The process of conflict management is operationalized with two proxies-actors, and arenas-and a taxonomy of conflict terminations is presented. The viability of the framework is tested both by mapping coalition governments according to their modes of managing internal conflicts and, after deriving research hypotheses, through empirical inquiries of conflict management in diverse coalitions.

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A Spatial Analysis of the Italian Second Republic

Cited by 5 publications

References 20 publications

A Cross‐National Analysis of Party Switching

A Cross‐National Analysis of Party Switching

An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

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