Though instances of party switching have been widely documented, there is little cross‐national research on this phenomenon. The prevalence of switching is therefore unknown, and the factors influencing this behavior remain unclear. Using the most comprehensive dataset on party switching ever constructed, we illustrate both that interparty movement is more common than previously assumed and that there are substantial differences in its prevalence across parties. To explain this variation, we examine the relationship between legislators' motivations, institutional arrangements, and switching. We find that motivational explanations are correlated with interparty movement and that institutional arrangements exhibit only limited direct influence on switching.

It has been argued that inclusive and decentralized selection procedures create greater incentives for parliamentarians to enhance their personal reputations. However, while the observable implications of this theory are at the level of individual members, the empirical data often brought to bear on this question to date have been collected at an aggregate level—the partisan bloc or legislative term. Despite some previously positive aggregate results, the author finds no discernible support for the connection between candidate selection procedures and vote-seeking behavior in Israel at the individual parliamentarian level. The author suggests an alternative theory—based on the stage of the legislative career—that explains both individual-level behavior and the aggregate-level trend.

Intra-party candidate selection processes are one of the prime mechanisms through which parties organize. This article seeks to examine empirically what factors account for variation in candidate selection processes. After identifying the key assertions developed in the literature, I use a unique cross-national dataset with data on the selection procedures of 512 parties in 46 countries to examine whether a party’s ideology, size, regime type, territorial organization and region affect the way parties select their legislative candidates. I pay special attention to the hypothesized relationships between electoral systems and selection processes, since the literature was indecisive and since research on the effects of institutions on legislators’ behaviour often amalgamated elections and selections. Underlying this amalgamation is an assumption that electoral systems determine candidate selection processes. I use my data to shed light on these relationships and provide a cautionary tale about amalgamating elections and selections.

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