Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behavior

Shomer, Yael

doi:10.1177/0010414008330600

Cited by 67 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…They have drawn on the literature on electoral systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Results suggest a positive effect on activities aiming to build a personal reputation (Hazan and Rahat, 2000; although contested by Shomer, 2009), and on MP responsiveness to local demands (Norris, 2006, p. 105), as well as a negative effect on responsiveness to party requirements (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, 1999;Sieberer, 2006). Both axes of the selection process refer to situations of asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament.…”

Section: Candidate Selection: Inclusiveness and Decentralizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse-selection model I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The Moreover, the greater the variation in the candidates' ability, the greater the prior uncertainty around candidacies. This again, increases the effect of performance, as the selectorate needs more information. I test this implication by identifying categories of MEPs whose ability to influence is particularly uncertain.The following study is based on the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members in 11 member-states of the European Union across three elections. The analysis is based on original data on the list placement of 1134 incumbent MEPs, their political background, as well as their effort and performance in office. Results show that

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Section: Candidate Selection: Inclusiveness and Decentralizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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“…Second, candidate selection is one of the main instruments for parties to enforce party discipline and control the legislative behavior of MPs (Bowler, Farrell, & Katz, 1999;Hazan & Rahat, 2006;Shomer, 2009). Since incumbent MPs rely on the party selectorate for reselection, they will be inclined to appease the party elite and toe the party line.…”

Section: Trespassing the Secret Garden: A Theoretical Framework For Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Choice of Spitzenkandidaten: A Comparative Analysis of the Europarties’ Selection Procedures

Put

Hecke

Cunningham

et al. 2016

PaG

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The selection of leading candidates by the political families, the so-called Spitzenkandidaten, is relatively groundbreaking as it is the first form of political recruitment organized at the EU level. The literature on candidate selection procedures has so far concentrated on national parties and their procedures. To our knowledge the analytical model has not yet been applied at the EU level. This article will fill this gap by examining the selection procedures of Europarties, more particularly for their EC presidency candidates, a novelty of the 2014 European Parliament elections. Based on the analysis of the procedures applied within the European People's Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE), the European Green Party (EGP), and the Party of the European Left (EL), one of the main findings of this article is that the procedures are largely copy-paste from the Europarties' internal procedures for selecting a president. This can largely be explained by the lack of time and experience their party elites had in the run-up to the 2014 elections. We therefore expect the Europarties to further professionalize their selection procedures and start the process earlier with more high profile politicians to stand as candidates in 2019.

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“…While earlier studies have used integrated 6-point and 8-point scales amalgamating these two dimensions (Shomer, 2009;Shomer, 2014) Finally, two control variables will be added to the analysis: the relative number of realistic slots on the party list, and the relative size of the largest city in the district. A large number of realistic list positions increases the available space on the list to balance the ticket, and should be taken into account.…”

Section: The Case Of Belgiummentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Geographical Representation on Candidate Lists in Flexible-List Systems: Lessons from the Belgian Case

Put

2015

Politics

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Based on a dataset of candidates from 488 party lists for Belgian lower house elections in the period 1987–2010, this contribution analyses the effects of electoral system-related and party-related determinants on the level of geographical representation on party lists. The results show that decentralised candidate selection methods lead to higher levels of geographical representation on the list in its entirety. With regard to realistic slots, it is found that the percentage of female candidates is negatively associated with geographical representation. Additionally, in districts where the largest city is dominant in terms of population size, it is more difficult for selectorates to realise geographical balance.

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Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behavior

Cited by 67 publications

References 35 publications

Striving for influence

Striving for influence

The Choice of Spitzenkandidaten: A Comparative Analysis of the Europarties’ Selection Procedures

Determinants of Geographical Representation on Candidate Lists in Flexible-List Systems: Lessons from the Belgian Case

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