A strategic analysis of network reliability

Bala, Venkatesh; Goyal, Sanjeev

doi:10.1007/s100580000019

Cited by 92 publications

(97 citation statements)

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“…Both the versions have been extensively studied in the literature. Theoretical work on this model includes Bala and Goyal (2000b), Deroian (2003), Dutta and Jackson (2000), Feri (2004aFeri ( , 2004b, Haller and Sarangi (2001) and Watts (2001). There have also been several experimental tests of the predictions of the connections model; see e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Network formation with heterogeneous players

Galeotti¹,

Goyal²,

Kamphorst

2006

Games and Economic Behavior

Self Cite

223

123

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show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Network formation with heterogeneous players

Galeotti¹,

Goyal²,

Kamphorst

2006

Games and Economic Behavior

Self Cite

223

123

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show abstract

“…Excellent monographs on social and economic networks are Goyal (2007), Jackson (2008) and Vega-Redondo (2007 situations, where strong doubly-supported links ''work'' better than weak singly-supported ones, but both types of link are feasible. If links are interpreted as attempts to initiate communication which may fail with a certain probability, as in Bala and Goyal (2000b), it is assumed here that communication through a link is insured when both players intend it, otherwise it might fail with some probability. 2 We study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stability for this intermediate model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation: A transition without decay

Olaizola

Valenciano

2015

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…Further, other benchmark models of strategic network formation ought to be considered. One could allow for imperfectly reliable links as in Bala and Goyal (2000b) and Haller and Sarangi (2005) or for information decay as in Galeotti et al (2006) and Billand et al (2010). In the remainder of this section, I am going to outline and suggest three more topics for future research.…”

Section: Final Remarks Queries and Ramificationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Network extension

Haller

2012

Mathematical Social Sciences

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a b s t r a c tIn a model of strategic network formation, the endogenously formed network is built around a preexisting network. We envisage that the pre-existing or core network is publicly provided. Strategic network formation is decentralized: Players act in their private interest and bear the costs when adding links to the pre-existing network. We study how the pre-existing network affects existence of Nash equilibria and efficiency of Nash equilibrium outcomes: It can foster or prohibit existence of Nash equilibria. It can improve or worsen equilibrium welfare. Special attention is paid to an insider-outsider model where society is partitioned into several groups and links within a group (between insiders) are much cheaper than links across groups (between outsiders). We also present equilibrium existence results and examine the effect of Pareto optimal publicly provided networks.

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A strategic analysis of network reliability

Cited by 92 publications

References 0 publications

Network formation with heterogeneous players

Network formation with heterogeneous players

Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation: A transition without decay

Network extension

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