A Supply Side Theory of Mediation

Abstract

We develop and test a theory of the supply side of third party conflict management. Building on an existing formal model of mediation (Kydd 2003), we consider several factors that increase the pool of potential neutral mediators and the frequency of mediators' efforts to manage interstate conflicts. First, we argue that democratic mediators face greater audience costs for deception in the conflict management process because the media in democratic states is more likely to uncover attempts by democratic mediators to provide false information. Second, we argue that information in the global mediation marketplace becomes more accurate as the international system becomes more democratic because there is a wider network of vigilant free presses, which increases the costs of deception for potential mediators. Third, as disputants' ties to international organizations increase, this also raises the costs that mediators incur for dishonesty in the conflict management process because these institutions provide more frequent and accurate information about the disputants' capabilities and resolve. Empirical analyses of data on contentious issues (1816-2001) provide support for our theory, with third party conflict management occurring more frequently if a potential mediator is a democracy, and as the average global democracy level and the number of shared IO memberships between disputants rises. We also find that powerful states serve as mediators more often, and that trade ties, alliances, issue salience, and distance influence third party decisions to mediate.

Democratic Communities and Third-Party Conflict Management

“…We also include the proportion of democracies in the international system to begin distinguishing our argument from Mitchell (2002) and Crescenzi et al (2011). In some models, we also similarly interact this global democracy variable with the measures of salience and intractability to confirm that the neighborhood democracy strength variable is indeed picking up on local and not global mechanisms at play.…”

“…We are thus left with a puzzle when confronted with the competing findings that third-party conflict management trends with the number of democracies in the international system but the regime type of the disputants themselves is not strongly associated with the practice of third-party conflict management. Crescenzi et al (2011) provide a separate link between conflict management and the global spread of democracy by considering the availability of credible mediators. They present multiple arguments-some based on an understanding of democratic norms and some based on an understanding of institutional constraints that rational democratic leaders face-for the expectation that there will be a better supply of credible mediators as the number of democracies in the international system increases.…”

“…Like Mitchell (2002) and Crescenzi et al (2011), we contend that community matters, but our focus is on how institutional mechanisms in local democratic communities increase the number of willing third parties. When disputes occur in the midst of many democratic neighbors, particularly when the disputes are sufficiently salient and not intractable, the disputants are more likely to encounter democratic neighbors that would like to become involved.…”

Leanings and Dealings: Exploring Bias and Trade Leverage in Civil War Mediation by International Organizations

“…Likewise, the few large-n studies that put medi ation by 10s center stage tend to neglect issues of bias (e.g. Boehmer et al 2004;Crescenzi et al 2011;Gartner 2011;Hansen et al 2008). This has left schol arship on m ediation bias, and hence on mediation more generally, in a posi tion where it cannot convincingly account for the effect of some of the most frequent mediators, 10s, in the realm where contemporary mediation is most prevalent, civil wars.…”

The Impact of Trade on International Mediation

“…Third, Crescenzi et al (2008) are interested in the credibility of a prospective mediator. The authors claim that if outside parties share trade relationships with a disputant, then the former will be biased toward this belligerent.…”