A theory of if: A lexical entry, reasoning program, and pragmatic principles.

Braine, Martin D. S.; O'Brien, David P.

doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.182

Cited by 270 publications

(241 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…Rather, in each of our recent studies (as independently confirmed by others), logic inference is associated with the activation of regions that have been linked to goal/subgoal processing in tasks requiring multiple steps and embedded operations (41) as well as coordination and selection of rules for path-finding from an initial to a final state (44,45). Such cognitive processes are intriguingly consistent with a ''rule-based'' account of deduction (59,60,61). The latter theory conceives inference as the construction of a chain of structured representations within LOT leading from premises to conclusions via intermediate transformations licensed by elementary rules of inference.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 57%

The boundaries of language and thought in deductive inference

Monti

Parsons

Osherson

2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

153

182

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Is human thought fully embedded in language, or do some forms of thought operate independently? To directly address this issue, we focus on inference-making, a central feature of human cognition. In a 3T fMRI study we compare logical inferences relying on sentential connectives (e.g., not, or, if . . . then) to linguistic inferences based on syntactic transformation of sentences involving ditransitive verbs (e.g., give, say, take). When contrasted with matched grammaticality judgments, logic inference alone recruited ''core'' regions of deduction [Brodmann area (BA) 10p and 8m], whereas linguistic inference alone recruited perisylvian regions of linguistic competence, among others (BA 21, 22, 37, 39, 44, and 45 and caudate). In addition, the two inferences commonly recruited a set of general ''support'' areas in frontoparietal cortex (BA 6, 7, 8, 40, and 47). The results indicate that logical inference is not embedded in natural language and confirm the relative modularity of linguistic processes.fMRI ͉ logic ͉ reasoning ͉ semantics ͉ syntax T he interplay between language and thought is pivotal to the study of human cognition (1-4). A principal issue is the extent to which thinking is embedded in language (5, 6). Within neuroscience, the matter has been explored in the domain of arithmetic (7), music (8), theory of mind (9), and deductive reasoning (10, 11). In the case of deduction, however, the evidence is highly contradictory. Some studies report that logic inference recruits neural structures traditionally engaged by linguistic processing (10, 12). These findings would suggest that thought is deeply rooted in language, a view consistent with certain psychological and philosophical perspectives on deduction (13,14). Other studies have failed to detect such activity (15, 16), which counts against the hypothesis that reasoning is tributary to language. These competing interpretations, however, are entirely based on indirect secondary observation qualitatively comparing language activations in one study to logic activations in another study across different methods, materials, paradigms, and subjects. In the present study we address this issue directly by comparing, within the same group of participants, inference based on logic connectives to inferences based on the syntax and semantics of ditransitive verbs.Consider, for example, arguments 1a and 2a in Table 1 (each with a single premise). The two arguments are equally valid in the sense that the truth of their respective premises guarantees the truth of their conclusions. But their validity rests on vocabulary from different lexical categories. The validity of argument 1a is based on the sentential connectives ''if . . . then,'' ''or,'' etc., whereas the validity of argument 2a depends on the principal phrasal verb (and similarly for the invalidity of arguments 1b and 2b, respectively). The semantic contrast between the two cases is apparent although difficult to characterize precisely (17). Roughly, connectives do not contribute to the topic of a sentence a...

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 57%

The boundaries of language and thought in deductive inference

Monti

Parsons

Osherson

2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

153

182

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“…It does not, however, reveal anything profound about reasoning proper. It does not provide evidence for or against different theories of human reasoning such as mental logic (Braine & O'Brien, 1991;Braine & Rumain, 1983;Rips, 1994), mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983;JohnsonLaird & Byrne 1991), pragmatic schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985;Cheng et al, 1986), and Darwinian algorithms (Cosmides, 1989). In the Selection Task, the various reasoning processes that have been suggested on the basis of these theories are pre-empted by processes that determine intuitions of relevance.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relevance theory explains the selection task

1995

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We propose a general and predictive explanation of the Wason Selection Task (where subjects are asked to select evidence for testing a conditional "rule"). Our explanation is based on a reanalysis of the task, and on Relevance Theory. We argue that subjects' selections in all true versions of the Selection Task result from the following procedure. Subjects infer from the rule directly testable consequences. They infer them in their order of accessibility, and stop when the resulting interpretation of the rule meets their expectations of relevance. Subjects then select the cards that may test the consequences they have inferred from the rule. Order of accessibility of consequences and expectations of relevance vary with rule and context, and so, therefore, does subjects' performance. By devising appropriate rule-context pairs, we predict that correct performance can be elicited in any conceptual domain. We corroborate this prediction with four experiments. We argue that past results properly reanalyzed confirm our account. We discuss the relevance of the Selection Task to the study of reasoning.

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“…The rule of conditional proof, for example, allows a reasoner to assume a proposition, A, for the sake of argument, and should that assumption together with other premises lead to a conclusion, C, then the reasoner can draw a conditional conclusion, if A then C. Similarly, a conditional premise, if A then C, together with a categorical premise, A, allows a reasoner to conclude, C, which is an inference of the sort known as modus ponens. Formal theorists recognize that conditionals can be interpreted in different ways (see, e.g., Braine & O'Brien, 1991), but they have not proposed any comprehensive theory of how such interpretations arise. Rips (1994), for example, finesses this problem, taking for granted that the input to his "PSYCOP" theory is the logical form of premises.…”

Section: Alternative Theories Of Conditionalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The modulation of conditional assertions and its effects on reasoning

Quelhas

Johnson‐Laird

Juhos

2010

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

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The theory of mental models postulates that conditionals of the sort, if A then C, have a “core” meaning referring to three possibilities: A and C, not-A and C, and not-A and not-C. The meaning of a conditional's clauses and general knowledge can modulate this meaning, blocking certain possibilities or adding relations between the clauses. Four experiments investigated such interpretations in factual and deontic domains. In Experiment 1, the participants constructed instances of what was possible and what was impossible according to various conditionals. The results corroborated the general predictions of the model theory and also the occurrence of modulation. The resulting interpretations governed the conclusions that participants accepted in Experiment 2, which also yielded the predicted effects of a time limit on responding. In Experiment 3, the participants drew the predicted conclusions for themselves. In Experiment 4, modulation led to predicted temporal relations between A and C. We relate these results to current theories of conditionals.

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A theory of if: A lexical entry, reasoning program, and pragmatic principles.

Cited by 270 publications

References 74 publications

The boundaries of language and thought in deductive inference

The boundaries of language and thought in deductive inference

Relevance theory explains the selection task

The modulation of conditional assertions and its effects on reasoning

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