Relevance theory explains the selection task

Abstract

We propose a general and predictive explanation of the Wason Selection Task (where subjects are asked to select evidence for testing a conditional "rule"). Our explanation is based on a reanalysis of the task, and on Relevance Theory. We argue that subjects' selections in all true versions of the Selection Task result from the following procedure. Subjects infer from the rule directly testable consequences. They infer them in their order of accessibility, and stop when the resulting interpretation of the rule meets their expectations of relevance. Subjects then select the cards that may test the consequences they have inferred from the rule. Order of accessibility of consequences and expectations of relevance vary with rule and context, and so, therefore, does subjects' performance. By devising appropriate rule-context pairs, we predict that correct performance can be elicited in any conceptual domain. We corroborate this prediction with four experiments. We argue that past results properly reanalyzed confirm our account. We discuss the relevance of the Selection Task to the study of reasoning.

The Human First Hypothesis: Identification of Conspecifics and Individuation of Objects in the Young Infant

“…Second, if we take the current formulation of relevance theory, there is a sense in which the HFH and a relevance-based account do not differ. According to relevance theory, relevance increases by either reducing cognitive effort or increasing cognitive effect (Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995;Sperber & Wilson, 1995). If infants possess special mechanisms to treat properties of congenerics, then processing information about humans is likely to be less costly than processing information about objects belonging to other categories.…”

The probabilistic approach to human reasoning

“…manipulations 57 , particularly involving reasoning about practical action 58 , that require a decisiontheoretic approach. Indeed, in our original paper on the selection task 6 the decision-theoretic approach was taken to these task versions, and we still believe that this is appropriate.…”

Inept reasoners or pragmatic virtuosos? Relevance and the deontic selection task

“…Evans (1989) maintained that participants understand the task as one of identifying the relevant cards, and use for this heuristic cues of relevance rather than deductive reasoning. Extending this insight, Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) argued that participants' poor performance on the selection task is best explained by considering that (1) the very process of linguistic comprehension provides participants with intuitions of relevance (see Sperber & Wilson 1995), (2) these intuitions, just as comprehension generally, are highly content-and context-dependent, and (3) participants trust their intuitions of relevance and select cards accordingly. In standard descriptive versions of the task, these intuitions are misleading, whereas in standard deontic versions, they point to the correct selection.…”