A top-down proof procedure for generalized data dependencies

Coulondre, Stéphane

doi:10.1007/s00236-002-0095-2

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…It relies on an external constraint solver over reals to handle constraints. Three dierent chases have been implemented : (Beeri and Vardi, 1984), (Maher and Srivastava, 1996) and (Coulondre, 2003). Given a logical formalization of an ac written using dependencies, the prototype If a role inherits another role and that role is in SSD with a third one, then the inheriting role is in SSD with the third one.…”

Section: Sample Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A relational database integrity framework for access control policies

Thion

Coulondre

2010

J Intell Inf Syst

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Access control is one of the most common and versatile mechanisms used for information systems security enforcement. An access control model formally describes how to decide whether an access request should be granted or denied. Since the rolebased access control initiative has been proposed in the 90s, several access control models have been studied in the literature. An access control policy is an instance of a model. It denes the set of basic facts used in the decision process. Policies must satisfy a set of constraints dened in the model, which reect some high level organization requirements. First-order logic has been advocated for some time as a suitable framework for access control models. Many frameworks have been proposed, focusing mainly on expressing complex access control models. However, though formally expressed, constraints are not dened in a unied language that could lead to some well-founded and generic enforcement procedures. Therefore, we make a clear distinction by proposing a logical framework focusing primarily on constraints, while keeping as much as possible a unied way of expressing constraints, policies, models, and reference monitors. This framework is closely tied to relational database integrity models. We then show how to use well-founded procedures in order to enforce and check constraints. Without requiring any rewriting previous to the inference process, these procedures provide clean and intuitive debugging traces for administrators. This approach is a step toward bridging the gap between general but hard to maintain formalisms and eective but insuciently general ones.

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Section: Sample Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have implemented the proof procedures for dependencies presented in (Beeri and Vardi, 1984), (Maher and Srivastava, 1996) and (Coulondre, 2003) to validate our approach. As shown in section 4.6, our prototype allows automatizing the consistency checking of Rbac policies and furnishing proof of previous results independently…”

Section: Formal Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A relational database integrity framework for access control policies

Thion

Coulondre

2010

J Intell Inf Syst

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“…• To investigates how the proof procedure for the implication problems, called chase (Biskup and Convent, 1991) and a new top-down proof procedure for generalized data dependencies (Coulondre, 2003) can be improved with the substitution paradigm.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In some cases, the new set has been treated completely and it does not have any redundant FD. In other cases, the new set has less size (considering both, attributes and FDs) than the original one and, consequently, can be treated more efficiently by other well known algorithms (Atzeni and Torlone, 1997;Biskup and Convent, 1991;Coulondre, 2003).…”

Section: A Pre-processing Transformation Based On the Substitution Pamentioning

confidence: 99%

A/D Case: A New Heart for Fd3

Mora¹,

Enciso²,

Guzmán³

et al. 2004

Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Pattern Recognition in Information Systems

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In (Enciso and Mora, 2002) we introduce the Functional Dependencies Data Dictionary (F D3) as an architecture to facilitate the integration of database Systems. We propose the use of logics based on the notion of Functional Dependencies (FD) to allows formal specification of the objects of a data model and to conceive future automated treatment. The existence of a FD logic provides a formal language suitable to carry out integration tasks and eases the design of an automatic integration process based in the axiomatic system of the FD logic. Besides that, F D3, provides a High Level Functional Dependencies (HLFD) Data Model which is used in a similar way as the Entity/Relationship Model. In this paper, we develop a CASE tool named A/D CASE (Attribute/Dependence CASE) that illustrates the practical benefits of the F D3 architecture. In the development of A/D CASE we have taken into account other theoretical results which improve our original F D3 proposal (Enciso and Mora, 2002). Particularly: • A new functional dependencies logic named SL F D for removing redundancy in a database sub-model that we present in (Mora, 2002; Cordero et al., 2002a). The use of SL F D add formalization to software engineering process. • An efficient preprocessing transformation based on the substitution paradigm that we present in (Mora et al., 2003). Unlike A/D CASE is independent from the Relational Model, it can be integrated into different database systems and it is compatible with relational DBMSs.

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“…Soit F l'ensemble des dépendances régissant l'exclusion mutuelle (section 5) ainsi que la dépendance f admin modélisant ce rôle particulier. Soit g : ssd(R 1 ,R 2 ),role(R 1 ),role(R 2 ) →⊥ la propriété que l'on veut savoir vérifiée "une contrainte d'exclusion mutuelle entre deux rôles quels qu'ils soient et l'existence d'un rôle administrateur rendent toute politique inconsistante" : 1) f admin : role(R) → hRole(administrateur, R), 2) f 1 : hRole(R 1 ,R 2 ),ssd(R 1 ,R 2 ) →⊥, 3) f 2 : hRole(R, R 1 ),hRole(R, R 2 ), ssd(R 1 ,R 2 ) →⊥, Les procédures de preuves (Maher et al, 1996;Beeri et al, 1984;Coulondre, 2003) que nous avons évoqué en section 3.2 permettent de répondre à ce type de problèmes, et prouvent sur cet exemple que effectivement F |= g, l'existence d'une contrainte d'exclusion mutuelle interdit la présence d'un rôle administrateur.…”

Section: Exempledevérification Automatiséeunclassified

Contrôle d'accès logique au dossier patient informatisé

Thion¹,

Coulondre²,

Flory³

2007

Santé et systémique

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information médicale. Définir les règlements, les implémenter dans un dispositif de contrôle d'accès et les vérifier sont des défis organisationnels, techniques et scientifiques auxquels doivent faire face les établissements de santé. Cette problématique est d'autant plus exacerbée lorsque l'information est partagée et répartie. Cet article propose un cadre logique apportant une réponse aux problèmes d'expression, de stockage, d'interrogation et de validation des politiques d'autorisation complexes pour les systèmes d'information médicale. Nous illustrons notre approche sur une application des recommandations du Groupement pour

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A top-down proof procedure for generalized data dependencies

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

A relational database integrity framework for access control policies

A relational database integrity framework for access control policies

A/D Case: A New Heart for Fd3

Contrôle d'accès logique au dossier patient informatisé

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