A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of “Religious Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula

Abstract

This article discusses the meaning of the formulation of a new Turkish civic morality infused with Islam in contemporary Turkey through a content analysis of the 1995 and 2007–08 editions of Religious Culture and Morality course textbooks used in high school curricula. I argue that this course, while maintaining continuity with the republic's diffusion of national religious morality through a revised version of Islam, referred to as “Kemalist Islam,” concretizes in its recent syllabus the consequences of the re-Islamization of the Turkish public sphere since the 1990s. This article asks questions about the relationship between secularism, citizenship, and Islam in contemporary Turkey. I argue that the “privatized religious belief” that Kemalist secularism tried to propagate did not result in reinforcing individualism in Turkish society. Rather, it was thought to provide a basis for a civic morality reinforcing the holistic spirit of Turkish nationalism, which subordinates the individual to society. My research tries to figure out in what sense the content of Kemalist Islam, once the only legitimate religiosity taught in national education, changed with the modifications and whether Kemalist Islam loses its centrality in the definition of citizen identity, to the advantage of a new Islamic morality with the re-Islamization of the Turkish public sphere.

Citizenship, nationality and minorities in Turkey's textbooks: from politics of non-recognition to ‘difference multiculturalism’

“…These assumptions involve the notion that 'making education culturally relevant and inclusive would reduce the high incidence of school failure amongst culturally different students' and that 'learning about other cultures would reduce prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes among majority group children towards those who are different from them' (Egbo 2009, 55). However, the way Alevis were portrayed in the textbooks, as illustrated above, involves a SunniMuslim interpretation that sees Alevism as a folkloric element of Islam or a 'mystic interpretation of Sunnism' (Türkmen 2009). Moreover, given the fact today that Alevis' claim to be officially recognised is still denied and that they are included in a course promoting a Sunni version of Islam, we see that the incorporation of Alevis in the curriculum is far from promoting a sense of belonging among Alevi students.…”

“…The policies introduced by the junta of the 1980 coup illustrate the stance taken by the secular military forces. One of the educational reforms of the junta was the incorporation of a compulsory course entitled 'Religious Culture and Morals' in 1982 (Türkmen 2009). This course symbolises the larger project of restructuring society on the basis of conservative and Islamic values, at the same time neutralising the appeal of the radical rightist and leftist ideologies of the pre-1980 period (Kaya 2014).…”

“…(Akgül et al 2012, 55) Such generalised statements about Alevism do little to teach students about the realities of Alevism in Turkey or about the historical background to this topic. Instead, the presentation of Alevism more closely resembles the understanding of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which represents Sunni Islam (Türkmen 2009). Furthermore, since the core message put forward in all Religious Culture and Moral textbooks focuses on legitimacy of Sunni Islam, the portrayal of Alevism remains at a symbolic level.…”

Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey: The Vatican and the Diyanet to the Test of Politics

“…Therefore, the Kemalist state exerted a double influence over the Diyanet: on the one side, the agency was the tool through which operating a re-Islamisation based on an official Islam (Türkmen 2009) to the detriment of sectarian interpretations of Islam, like Alevi Muslims, Sufi orders (tarikatlar) and religious communities (cematlar); on the other side, the Diyanet epitomised a the Kemalist elite's will to tame religion. However, such a state control over religion should be attentively assessed to avoid one-way explanations relegating Diyanet's bureaucracy to the role of an uncritical yielding actor (Sakallioğlu, 1996: 236 (Yavuz 2003:59-81;Türkmen 2009:386).…”

“…Morality became not only a mandatory course included in the regular school curricula (Türkmen 2009), but also one of the ruling's instruments. The attempt to restore a muscled laicism willing to control religion and to relegate it to the private sphere resulted in a short parenthesis, 1997-2001, followed by fifteen years of religious conservative AKP rule.…”