A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88]

Aslan, Ömer

doi:10.1080/14683849.2014.956425

Cited by 19 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…They have a populist style that endorses a strong discourse of victimhood and presents themselves as the real representatives of the Turkish nation. Building on this sense of victimhood, they hold Kemalist nationalists responsible for Turkey’s loss of status in the international arena, attributing it to the imitative character of Kemalist nationalism (Aslan 2015). They want Turkey to endorse its Ottoman cultural and political legacy, which Kemalist nationalism denied, and to exert soft power on former Ottoman territories.…”

Section: Muslim Nationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Its two major representatives, the AKP and the Gülen movement, have had some significant differences. While the latter has advocated a more ethnocultural understanding of Turkishness, the AKP has portrayed itself as prioritizing Muslim identity over ethnic identity (Aslan 2015). Fethullah Gülen has been a leading advocate of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis 18 and perceived Turkish Islam to be unique and superior in the Muslim world (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı 2010, 227–228).…”

Section: Muslim Nationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Politics of Emotions and Spectacles: The Case of the Turkish Language Olympiads

Aslan

2019

Nationalities Papers

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This article examines the Turkish Language Olympiads as a political-performative strategy that the Muslim nationalists used to communicate their ideology. I argue that to understand the rise of Muslim nationalism, we also need to understand how emotional appeal is created through spectacles like the Turkish Olympiads. The spectacle was effective in boosting people’s sense of national pride and self-confidence by resolving two important tensions of Kemalist nationalism. First, it addressed the tension between Westernization and nationalization. Depicting an image of Turkish national culture that is appreciated and imitated by foreigners, it contested the imitative, Westernist character of Kemalist nationalism. Second, recasting the outside world as friendly to Turks, even Turkophile, it challenged Kemalist nationalism’s emphasis on external threats. Turkish-speaking and -acting foreigners communicated a message of nationalist self-empowerment and confidence, calling into question people’s sense of fear and distrust of the outside world. How Muslim nationalism was promoted, particularly the performative-symbolic strategies that were used, are important to understand because of their emotional resonance and potential for mass mobilization.

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Section: Muslim Nationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Muslim Nationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Emotions and Spectacles: The Case of the Turkish Language Olympiads

Aslan

2019

Nationalities Papers

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Disciples of the State?

Fabbe¹

2019

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Disciples of the State seeks to explain why some former Ottoman states succeeded in effectively secularizing schooling and law and regulating religion upon independencethereby consolidating state power-whereas others did not. The bulk of the project centers on a detailed investigation of three former-Ottoman country cases: Turkey, Greece, and Egypt. The main argument is built around a comparison of the critical historical antecedents that preceded independence in these three countries. My findings suggest that when manpower for early modernizing reforms in the 1 9 th century was severely constrained, state-builders were more likely to employ strategies of institutional reform based on co6ptation, thereby integrating religious elites into nascent state structures in a piecemeal fashion. This turbulent (and at times violent) process of integration and co6ptation spawned a dynamic of differential growth that severely weakened religious institutions. When religious institutions were weakened in this way in the 1 9 th century, it became possible for states to exert full control over the religious establishment upon independence, producing what we consider today to be successful "secular revolutions". I find that this dynamic played out in places as different as Greece and late Ottoman Turkey. Conversely, when manpower for modernizing reforms was more readily available (often as a result of colonial occupation) state-building strategies took a different form. Instead of co6ptating religious actors, state-builders created new sets of "parallel" disciplinary institutions that largely excluded traditional elites. In this context, rather than sharing expertise, religious institutions became largely insulated from the state, re-entrenched themselves, and grew in size over the late 19th and early 20th century. Upon independence, founding regimes thus inherited a deeply fractured system of disciplinary control making "secular revolutions" much more difficult to impose. I find the that this dynamic characterized state-building trajectories in Egypt.

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Preface

2019

Disciples of the State?

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A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88]

Cited by 19 publications

References 26 publications

The Politics of Emotions and Spectacles: The Case of the Turkish Language Olympiads

The Politics of Emotions and Spectacles: The Case of the Turkish Language Olympiads

Disciples of the State?

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