To address complications involving ambiguity, presupposition and implicature, three processes underlying natural language interpretation are isolated: translation, entailment and attunement. A metalanguage integrating these processes is outlined, elaborating on a proof-theoretic approach to presupposition. To appear: Festschrift for Solomon Feferman (ASL Lecture Notes series) x1. Introduction. However outrageous Montague's slogan \English as a formal language" 24] may sound, the pressure to push the claim as far as it can go is, for many, irresistible. Basic to Montague's understanding of a formal language is the possibility of a model-theoretic interpretation | of obvious interest in various applications (e.g. databases) that employ models. But formulas of predicate logic (rst-order or higher-order, modal or otherwise) di er signi cantly from English sentences marked with ambiguity and presupposition. Consider, for instance, (s) If Sylvester gets holds of a canary, the bird will perish. A very rough translation of (s) that falls short of predicate logic is (9y)(canary(y)^SylvesterGets(y)) willPerish(the bird) ; from which we might expect to extract various readings of (s), depending on how we treat the ill-formed expression the bird. For now, let us focus on the reading that construes the bird anaphorically as any canary Sylvester gets hold of. The obvious rendering in predicate logic, (8y) (canary(y)^SylvesterGets(y)) willPerish(y) ; As wide ranging as Solomon Feferman's work on logic is, natural language is not among his driving concerns. Nevertheless, I would like to think that studying papers such as Feferman 8, 9, 10] has helped me draw certain conceptual distinctions useful in natural language interpretation. And, as a grateful student of his, I want to try to say why. I am indebted to two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to the Feferfest committee for the opportunity of contributing to this volume. How I regret that I could not properly thank Jon Barwise.