A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies

Abstract

The literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions. The attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables, while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes. In this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches. We also generalize this unified model, and all previous models, by including (1) a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period, (2) a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions, and (3) a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables, the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries.

Worth the Wait: Determinants of Ministerial Appointment in Canada, 1935–2008

“…Drawing on methodological developments made in the government and ministerial survival literatures~Berlinski et al, 2007;Huber and MartinezGallardo, 2008;King et al, 1990!, this study employs an event history model to ascertain the determinants of ministerial appointment. It differs from both the government and ministerial survival literatures in that it focuses on the time that a government party MP spends on the backbenches prior to cabinet appointment rather than the time to ministerial exit or government termination.…”

Does Terrorism Influence Domestic Politics? Coalition Formation and Terrorist Incidents

“…Two attributes of governing coalitions that have been shown to influence government survival are of particular interest here. First, King et al (1990), Diermeier & Stevenson (1999) and Warwick (1994) show that majority coalitions last longer than minority coalitions. However, they do not consider whether surplus coalitions differ from minimal winning majority coalitions.…”

A Structural Model of Government Formation

“…Let D ≡ i∈D i denote the size of proto-coalition D. The proto-coalition bargains over the formation of a new government, which determines the allocation of government portfolios among the coalition members, Merlo (1997), we assume that cabinet portfolios generate a (perfectly divisible) unit level of surplus in every period a government is in power and we let T D ∈ 0 T denote the duration of a government formed by proto-coalition D. Government duration in parliamentary democracies is not fixed. Rather, it is a variable that depends on institutional factors (such as, for example, whether an investiture vote is required to form a government, whether a government needs to maintain the active support of a parliamentary majority, and the rules for tabling a vote of no-confidence), the relative size of the government coalition, the time horizon to the next election, the state of the political and economic system at the time a government forms, and political and economic events occurring while a government is in power (see, e.g., King et al (1990), Merlo (1998), andWarwick (1994) Note that constitutions are typically silent with respect to the rules for selecting a formateur, which are generally reflected in unwritten conventions and norms. This is the case for all the countries we consider.…”