2017
DOI: 10.1017/gov.2017.24
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A Zero-Sum Game? Repression and Protest in China

Abstract: Most scholarship on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes focuses on severe repression and transgressive protest (e.g. revolt), suggesting a zero-sum game played by the state and challengers. However, a burgeoning literature suggests that less brutal forms of authoritarian states have emerged in recent decades and that protesters in these countries tend to limit their challenges, avoiding direct confrontation with the authorities. If so, can the notion of the zero-sum game truly capture the nuances and… Show more

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Cited by 41 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…It may also tolerate short protests on some occasions, but not others. As research on the determinants of regime response to protest suggests, this may depend on a number of other considerations, including protest size, the nature of demands, the degree to which protests are linked to organized groups, the peacefulness of protest tactics, and the identity of protesters (Cai, 2010;Carey, 2009;Davenport et al, 2011;Goldstone & Tilly, 2001;Li, 2019). As such, while protest duration and geographic scope may affect, they do not consistently determine repression.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It may also tolerate short protests on some occasions, but not others. As research on the determinants of regime response to protest suggests, this may depend on a number of other considerations, including protest size, the nature of demands, the degree to which protests are linked to organized groups, the peacefulness of protest tactics, and the identity of protesters (Cai, 2010;Carey, 2009;Davenport et al, 2011;Goldstone & Tilly, 2001;Li, 2019). As such, while protest duration and geographic scope may affect, they do not consistently determine repression.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, popular mass mobilization typically triggers a repressive backlash by political authorities in both democracies and authoritarian regimes (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 1995a; McAdam, 1986). Yet, the personal risk involved in contentious participation is particularly high in the latter, for autocracies seldom ever hold back from deploying the full menu of coercive capacities, resulting in prolonged jail time, torture, or death (Li, 2019). The threat of such repressive actions is severe and certain, and overcoming personal risk perceptions remains the key factor in explaining popular mass mobilization (Kuran, 1991).…”
Section: Theorizing Revolutionary Changementioning
confidence: 99%
“…24 Davenport 2007. 25 Cai 2010Li 2019. empirically imperative to examine how the Chinese regime responds to resource conflicts.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%