Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What's Left to Leave?

Moses, Jonathon W.

doi:10.1177/0032329294022002002

Cited by 141 publications

(31 citation statements)

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“…The same logic applies to the 1992 and 1995 elections in Sweden, where increased capital mobility owing to liberalization and integration of international capital markets led social democrats and conservatives to converge toward …scal discipline and less generous welfare and wage policies (see Moses (1994) for a description of this "ideological abdication" of the Swedish social democrats). As the next section shows, when voters are ignorant of the risks of capital ‡ight or other forms of disruption, such "ideological abdication" becomes less likely and platform divergence will occur.…”

Section: Platform Commitment and No Private Informationmentioning

confidence: 93%

Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Ellman

Wantchékon

2000

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

117

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We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election.We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a "centrist" policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, "posturing" by the strong party leads to platform divergence.¤ We thank Timothy Feddersen, Geo¤rey Garrett, Oliver Hart, Mathias Hounkpe, Nien-He Hsieh, Elena Krasnokutskaya, Eric Maskin, Steve Morris, Roger Myerson, Martin Osborne, Ben Polak, Andrei Shleifer, Christopher Udry, Asher Wolinsky, two anonymous referees and an editor of this journal for comments and suggestions. We are also grateful for helpful comments from seminar participants at University of Michigan, Harvard University, New York University and Yale University.We are responsible for any remaining errors.

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Section: Platform Commitment and No Private Informationmentioning

confidence: 93%

Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Ellman

Wantchékon

2000

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

117

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“…Globalisation was seen to cut markets free from the traditional regulatory mechanisms of states and, in doing so, heighten the influence of markets, which favour liberal economic policies, at the expense of sovereign policy autonomy. The dilemma therein, as far as this article is concerned, is, as Kurzer neatly surmised, that this 'hurts social democratic governments more than conservative ones' (Kurzer, 1993, p. 252; see Moses, 1994). The inherent aim of social democracy, to regulate capitalism for the benefit of working people, was thus being rendered unachievable by the power of these new global markets (see Kurzer, 1993;Moses, 1994;Gray, 1996Gray, , 1997Huber and Stephens, 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…By the 1990s, after almost two decades of financial deregulation in the developed economies, many commentators from across the political spectrum understood economic globalisation to be a growing and inescapable force of modern capitalism (see Kurzer, 1993;Moses, 1994;Gray, 1996Gray, , 1997Giddens, 1998). Globalisation was seen to cut markets free from the traditional regulatory mechanisms of states and, in doing so, heighten the influence of markets, which favour liberal economic policies, at the expense of sovereign policy autonomy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Post-crisis social democratic policy capacity in France and the United Kingdom: A lesson from the globalisation and social democracy debate

McDaniel

2014

Fr Polit

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Two decades ago many commentators suggested that economic globalisation had eroded social democratic economic policy capacity. Although this argument has largely been discredited, the global financial crisis has revived the state-market debate. As governments succumb to fiscal consolidation, a similar theory of declining state capacity now challenges social democrats. This article redresses the contemporary situation by using the economic globalisation debate from the mid-1990s to 2005 as a lens through which to comparatively analyse the current fiscal policy positions of the Parti Socialiste and the Labour Party. It draws similarities between the two situations and illustrates how contested notions of the contemporary political economy constrain social democratic fiscal policy capacity, suggesting that greater capacity exists than is currently acknowledged.

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“…This led to a small flurry of political science writings on macro policy, including Andrews (1994), Moses (1994) and Notermans (1993Notermans ( , 1995.…”

Section: Reflection #2: Supply-side Bias Blinded Political Economy Tomentioning

confidence: 99%

Poor Governance in a Very Rich and Advanced (Micro)State: Reflections from Political Science

Tranøy¹

2011

Eur Polit Sci

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In addition to introducing and contextualizing the four other contributions to this symposium, this article makes three arguments. Firstly, the Icelandic case has shown up severe weaknesses in the internal market for financial services, including liquidity risk regulation and intergovernmental conflict resolution mechanisms. Echoing Scharpf's analysis of EU decision making, a deep asymmetry has been revealed: It was much easier to grant actors access to each other's domestic markets than to create a pan-European financial regulation creating a clear division of responsibilities and the ability to pool resources and share burdens. The second argument is that political economy has developed a supplyside bias. This has decreased attention to the mechanisms that inject instability into economic performance at the macro level and distribute risk and instability at the level of households and firms. The third point made is that while spectacular boom and bust cycles (reasonably) strengthen the case for less rationalistic micro foundations in the study of economic behaviour, this also entails the risk of losing sight of how perfectly rational (but immoral) financial actors take advantage of their less savvy counterparties -be they creditors, shareholders or taxpayers. The article concludes that financial stability is ultimately about governance and therefore about power.

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Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What's Left to Leave?

Cited by 141 publications

References 0 publications

Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Post-crisis social democratic policy capacity in France and the United Kingdom: A lesson from the globalisation and social democracy debate

Poor Governance in a Very Rich and Advanced (Micro)State: Reflections from Political Science

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