Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language

Moltmann, Friederike

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608744.001.0001

Cited by 125 publications

(91 citation statements)

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“…I argue here that the best account involves not the classical Hintikkan relational treatment, but something more exotic. In particular, following Kratzer 2006;Moulton 2009;Anand & Hacquard 2009Hacquard 2010 most directly, (see also Moltmann 1989Moltmann , 2003Moltmann , 2013Ginzburg 1995a inter alia) I argue that attitude predicates are properties of eventualities that have content. 'Arguments' to attitude predicates tell us about that content intersectively, rather than relationally.…”

Section: (4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…My proposal is that this is best accounted for by adopting two ideas from recent work on attitude ascriptions (Kratzer 1998(Kratzer , 2006Moulton 2009;Anand & Hacquard 2009Hacquard 2010; see also Moltmann 1989Moltmann , 2003Moltmann , 2013. The first is that attitude verbs are neo-Davidsonian predicates.…”

Section: Cross-categoriality: the Dual Life Of Entities And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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About 'about'

Rawlins

2013

SALT

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I provide a compositional account of about-PPs in combination with attitude predicates and content nouns, and as a predicate. The account requires that attitude predicates are properties of content-bearing eventualities, rather than relations that take propositions (or other clause denotations) as arguments. I argue further that the relevant notion of 'content' must be extremely general, allowing for question-like, proposition-like, and hybrid meanings.

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Section: (4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cross-categoriality: the Dual Life Of Entities And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

About 'about'

Rawlins

2013

SALT

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“…19 The same contrast can be observed with verbs of creation, which themselves are in fact intensional verbs (Moltmann [15]):…”

Section: (A) John Mentioned What Bill Mentioned (A Woman With Red Hair)mentioning

confidence: 78%

Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs

Moltmann

2015

Synthese Library

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Whether natural language permits quantification over 'nonexistent', intentional objects is subject of a major controversy, as is the nature of such entities themselves. This paper argues that certain constructions in natural language involving 'intentional verbs' such as 'think of ', 'describe', and 'imagine' cannot be analysed compositionally without positing intentional objects, as entities strictly dependent on intentional acts. The paper also argues that intentional verbs involve a distinctive semantics, which is fundamentally different from that of intensional transitive verbs, a difference reflected in a range of quantificational phenomena.The questions whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the 'nonexistent' objects of thought is the topic of major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. Many philosophers deny the possibility of there being 'nonexistent' objects of thought. Others following Meinong [12], take 'nonexistent' objects of thought to be entities individuated only by a particular set of properties, and as having a weaker form of being than existence. Yes others, in the tradition of Brentano [1], admit the possibility of intentional, nonexistent objects, but take them to be dependent on an intentional act or state. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come for free; rather they are strictly dependent on intentional acts that generally need to be present, in one way or another, in the semantic structure of the sentence.The constructions in question display a particular dependence of intentional objects on the event argument of an intentional verb in the same sentence, a verb like F. Moltmann ( )

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“…For further arguments that we don't see facts, see Moltmann (2013). approaches to perceptual experience.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language

Cited by 125 publications

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About 'about'

About 'about'

Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs

How and Why Knowledge is First

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