Accidental Nuclear War?

Blair, Bruce G.

doi:10.2307/20080251

Cited by 10 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…10,30 On January 25, 1995, a warning related to a U.S. scientific rocket launched from Norway led to the activation, for the first time in the nuclear era, of the "nuclear suitcases" carried by the top Russian leaders and initiated an emergency nuclear-decision-making conference involving the leaders and their top nuclear advisors. 27,32,33 Delta-IV submarines carry 16 missiles. 10,24,27 A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals.…”

Section: Continued Danger Of a Nuclear Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It took about eight minutes to conclude that the launch was not part of a surprise nuclear strike by Western submarines -less than four minutes before the deadline for ordering a nuclear response under standard Russian launch-on-warning protocols. 34,35 These missiles are believed to be aimed at "soft" targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. mili-tary installations. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk.…”

Section: Continued Danger Of a Nuclear Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Accidental Nuclear War — A Post–Cold War Assessment

Forrow

Blair²,

Helfand³

et al. 1998

N Engl J Med

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Section: Continued Danger Of a Nuclear Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Continued Danger Of a Nuclear Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accidental Nuclear War — A Post–Cold War Assessment

Forrow

Blair²,

Helfand³

et al. 1998

N Engl J Med

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Second, the Delta-IV is and will remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet. 27,32,33 Delta-IV submarines carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea.…”

Section: Continued Danger Of a Nuclear Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea. 34,35 These missiles are believed to be aimed at "soft" targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. mili-tary installations. 36 Although a number of targeting strategies are possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas.…”

Section: Continued Danger Of a Nuclear Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Medicare Policy for Future Generations — A Search for a Permanent Solution

Gramm

Rettenmaier²,

Saving³

1998

N Engl J Med

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“…It also shaped culture (not always of the lower variety! ), led to the deaths of millions (primarily in the Third World), made some states rich and powerful, others poor and miserable, and for the better part of 40 years threatened to destroy us all (see Blair 1993). Little wonder that thecold war was studied in such minute detail.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why did We Get the End of the Cold War Wrong?

Cox

2009

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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In many important ways the history of modern international relations (IR) begins at the point when the international order collapses in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, the withering of communism in Central and Eastern Europe followed by the break-up of the USSR two years later, posed what many in the field saw then (and continue to regard now) as a series of problems to which the hitherto dominant paradigm in IR-realism-had no ready or easy answers. This article neither seeks to defend nor criticize realism. Rather it shifts the debate about the end of the cold war-and why most experts failed to anticipate it-away from the field of IR to the more specific study undertaken in the West of the Soviet system. It goes on to argue that the source of so much academic embarrassment may be better explained not through a rehearsal of realism's supposed flaws as an international theory, but rather through a detailed examination of the different ways that different writers understood, or more precisely failed to understand, the operation of the Soviet system itself. The conclusion reached is that few analysts could have predicted what happened between 1989 and 1991. In fact, as the article seeks to show, their often complicated and diverse theories about the USSR as the living alternative to market capitalism led most of them (with one or two notable exceptions) to the conclusion that whatever problems faced the Soviet Union as a power in the 1980s, the system as such was likely to endure.

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Accidental Nuclear War?

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Accidental Nuclear War — A Post–Cold War Assessment

Accidental Nuclear War — A Post–Cold War Assessment

Medicare Policy for Future Generations — A Search for a Permanent Solution

Why did We Get the End of the Cold War Wrong?

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