Accountability in Public International Development Finance

Macdonald, Kate; Miller-Dawkins, May

doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12273

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(42 reference statements)

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“…Power differentials in development cooperation schemes make it difficult to hold providers accountable, as both Northern and Southern provider governments primarily focus on the concerns of their national constituencies (Lancaster, 2007; Waisbich, 2023). While Northern donors prioritise showing adherence to minimum standards to their donor community rather than addressing concerns of aid beneficiaries, the latter's reputational sanctioning attempts usually have limited impact on donor actions (Macdonald & Miller‐Dawkins, 2015: 431). Like UN entities, the GPEDC is unable to enforce sanctions for non‐compliance with effectiveness principles; its capacity for reputational sanctioning is significantly limited by the non‐engagement of major Southern providers, which has undermined its legitimacy and relevance (Taggart, 2022b).…”

Section: Backward‐looking Accountability In Gdg 20mentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Development Governance 2.0: Fractured accountabilities in a divided governance complex

Haug,

Taggart

2023

Global Policy

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The proliferation of state and non‐state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, has led to a qualitative shift in Global Development Governance (GDG) towards what we term ‘GDG 2.0’. Realising accountability in this context presents challenges due to growing actor diversity, institutional plurality and a lack of formalised accountability structures. Building on the introduction to this special section, we explore the potential of ‘forward‐looking’ approaches to accountability, notably collective deliberation, learning and competition. Despite the importance of these mechanisms for GDG processes, conceptualising them as accountability tools may have limited gains and indeed reinforce the preferences of established actors, dilute useful monitoring approaches and divert attention from longstanding agendas. We argue that prioritising enabling environments for more circumscribed ‘backward‐looking’ accountability—with a focus on standard‐setting and monitoring—may be more feasible and effective towards holding decision‐makers to account within the GDG 2.0 context.

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Section: Backward‐looking Accountability In Gdg 20mentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Development Governance 2.0: Fractured accountabilities in a divided governance complex

Haug,

Taggart

2023

Global Policy

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“…Indeed, as of 2012, more than a dozen IAMs were in operation globally and they had collectively handled a total of 260 complaints spanning 72 countries (CAO 2012). This may come as no surprise given that accountability and transparency mechanisms have long been held to promote improvements in governance, empowerment, responsibility, and democracy (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015;MacDonald and Miller-Dawkins 2015;Dobel 1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring the moneylenders: Institutional accountability and environmental governance at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel

Sovacool

2017

The Extractive Industries and Society

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“…Based on a detailed analysis of the AM's investigations over the last decade these sections identify when PAP were able to have their voices heard and when the process failed. This qualitative research uses thick description, which enables scholars to identify ‘patterns of norms, institutions and power relations of particular salience in a given context’ (see Macdonald and Miller‐Dawkins, ). This involved 35 in‐depth interviews with ADB staff including former and current external accountability officers, former Executive Directors, former US officials and accountability activists between 2009 and 2014.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing Accountability in Practice: The Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism

Park

2015

Global Policy

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Intergovernmental Organizations (IOs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were created by and for states. The ADB was established to further economic growth and cooperation in the Asia Pacific. At the behest of its powerful member states the ADB created an accountability mechanism (AM) in 1995. This mechanism was created to provide recourse to people that might be or are 'directly materially and adversely affected' by a development project financed by the ADB. As with the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the creation of such an 'external accountability mechanism' recognized a legally relevant relationship between an IO and private persons. This article investigates the operations of the ADB's AM. Arguably, the ADB's AM has brought some improvement to affected people through its mediation, compliance investigations and monitoring. Yet analysis of the mechanism also demonstrates that progress is hampered by a lack of access, transparency, Developing Member Country (DMC) resistance, staff obstruction and a lack of independence in the mechanism itself. Policy Implications• Continued state support of the external AMs of the MDBs must rest on recognising the ability of these mechanisms to improve the plight of project affected people, while continuing to address their limitations.

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Accountability in Public International Development Finance

Abstract: As the contributions to this collection highlight, the capacities and limits of formal mechanisms of accountability to promote their intended normative purposes depend in important ways on the political and institutional contexts in which accountability mechanisms operate.

Cited by 7 publications

References 28 publications

Global Development Governance 2.0: Fractured accountabilities in a divided governance complex

Global Development Governance 2.0: Fractured accountabilities in a divided governance complex

Monitoring the moneylenders: Institutional accountability and environmental governance at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel

Assessing Accountability in Practice: The Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism

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