Assessing Accountability in Practice: The Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism

Abstract

Intergovernmental Organizations (IOs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were created by and for states. The ADB was established to further economic growth and cooperation in the Asia Pacific. At the behest of its powerful member states the ADB created an accountability mechanism (AM) in 1995. This mechanism was created to provide recourse to people that might be or are 'directly materially and adversely affected' by a development project financed by the ADB. As with the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the creation of such an 'external accountability mechanism' recognized a legally relevant relationship between an IO and private persons. This article investigates the operations of the ADB's AM. Arguably, the ADB's AM has brought some improvement to affected people through its mediation, compliance investigations and monitoring. Yet analysis of the mechanism also demonstrates that progress is hampered by a lack of access, transparency, Developing Member Country (DMC) resistance, staff obstruction and a lack of independence in the mechanism itself. Policy Implications• Continued state support of the external AMs of the MDBs must rest on recognising the ability of these mechanisms to improve the plight of project affected people, while continuing to address their limitations.

Accountability in Public International Development Finance

“…Such reforms at the World Bank diffused gradually into other multilateral development institutions leading to the creation of the ADB's Office of the Special Projects Facilitator and the CAO‐IFC (Fox, ; Park, ; Park, ). A number of other regional development banks have subsequently established accountability mechanisms (Nanwani, ), and United Nations programs such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN‐REDD) are now developing similar compliance review and grievance mechanisms focused on project affected communities (United Nations Development Program, ).…”

“…The outcomes of such contests are difficult to predict, and depend crucially on the specific institutional and political contexts in which these mechanisms are created and implemented. Park () highlights tensions between the ADB's accountability to member states that contribute to its financial base, and its ‘external’ accountability to those affected by the bank's operations. Cabral and Leite () highlight similar tensions between the multiple accountability relationships operating within highly fragmented development cooperation policy making processes in Brazil, and among the multiple agencies and stakeholders affected by development programs in recipient countries.…”

“…What then can we say about the impact of changing accountability arrangements on the capacity of ‘beneficiary’ groups to influence development activity in which they have a direct stake? The papers by both Park () and Balaton‐Chrimes and Haines () present examples where independent accountability mechanisms established by multilateral lending institutions have enhanced the capacity of communities to air their grievances. In some cases they have also enabled communities to access compensation for project impacts, such as loss of livelihoods, or to negotiate other improvements to their conditions.…”

“…Examining the evolving accountability mechanisms adopted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Susan Park's paper likewise finds that while these mechanisms can provide some recourse to people who are directly materially and adversely affected by development projects financed by the ADB, their capacity to provide more extensive forms of remedy is limited. Drawing on an empirical assessment of cases across the history of the ADB accountability mechanism, Park () concludes that gaps in redress to project‐affected peoples persist. By placing analysis of these practical failings in the context of a broader analysis of the ADB accountability system's political and institutional development, Park () sheds light on some of the underlying political barriers that accountability institutions face as they attempt to influence relationships of power and responsiveness between development stakeholders.…”

“…Drawing on an empirical assessment of cases across the history of the ADB accountability mechanism, Park () concludes that gaps in redress to project‐affected peoples persist. By placing analysis of these practical failings in the context of a broader analysis of the ADB accountability system's political and institutional development, Park () sheds light on some of the underlying political barriers that accountability institutions face as they attempt to influence relationships of power and responsiveness between development stakeholders.…”