“…This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, prior literature investigates the impact of managerial incentives on corporate disclosures in the setting of equity offerings (Frankel, McNichols and Wilson, ; Marquardt and Wiedman, ; Lang and Lundholm, ; Kim, ), stock repurchases (Brockman, Khurana and Martin, ), management buyout offers (Hafzalla, ), stock‐for‐stock mergers (Ge and Lennox, ), stock and stock option grants (Aboody and Kasznik, ; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, ), and insider trading (Bushman and Indjejikian, ; Rogers and Stocken, ; Cheng and Lo, ; Rogers, ; Cheng, Luo and Yue, ). Nevertheless, despite the importance of credit rating to a firm, little research attention has been paid to managers’ use of voluntary disclosures to influence credit ratings.…”