Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments

Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy

“…In any (accuracy-contingent) g-TFT equilibrium, the more accurate the monitoring technology is, the less intensively a player retaliates against the opponent. This view, however, contradicts the experimental results given by Kayaba, Matsushima, and Toyama (2019).…”

“…In a g-TFT strategy, a player retaliates against the opponent by selecting the defective action more often when he/she observes the bad signal than when he/she observes the good signal. In line with this argument, the experimental studies of Kayaba, Matsushima, and Toyama (2019) indicates that among a wide variety of strategies, a significant proportion of experimental subjects adopts a g-TFT strategy even if they employ heterogeneous g-TFT.…”

“…In other words, in the presence of high monitoring accuracy, a player can more effectively penalize the deviant even if the retaliation that he/she employs is not intensive. 5 In contrast with this theoretical prediction, Kayaba, Matsushima, and Toyama (2019) reports experimental results indicating that subjects in laboratory experiments tend to retaliate more in the presence of accurate monitoring than in the low accuracy scenario.…”

Cooperation in an Uncertain and Dynamic World

“…However, it is possible that players do not even know what signals other players have observed about their own play, thereby making the monitoring structure private. There are few empirical studies on cooperation under private monitoring, e.g.,Kayaba et al (2016) andAoyagi et al…”

“Do humans play according to the game theory when facing the social dilemma situation?” A survey study.

“…14) . Other than 2 × 2 game settings, there have been affluent experimental works concerning Public Goods Game [15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33] , experimental economics across subject populations 34) , when faced with a new game, participants use strategies that reflect both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects 35) , subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy 36) , the average intelligence of the world's appears, help to create a more cooperative world 37) , in experimentally, the more cooperative is raised when the dilemma situation becomes less 38) , the cooperation of the partner increases in the repeated games for a long horizon and no significant distinguish with a short period of time 39) , experience subjects play the vital role for the emergence of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma games 40) , subjects appear to use a "loss-avoidance" selection principle: they expect others to avoid strategies that always result in losses 41) , characteristics of interaction partner (i.e., a long-term partner or a stranger) affect human cooperation and punishment in public goods experiment in which increasing the cooperation level, punishment is reduced due to potential free riders 42) , longterm interaction is a well-known factor to maintains cooperation; it has been known as theory of direct reciprocity or reciprocal altruism in the social life network [43][44] .…”