Actions, thought-experiments and the ‘Principle of alternate possibilities’

Alvarez, Maria

doi:10.1080/00048400802215505

Cited by 37 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…As Harry Frankfurt (1969) observes, philosophers used to insist that the agent could have done otherwise and prevent the outcome from materializing. One of many alternatives that have been defended is that it suffices if the agent is able to refrain from contributing to it (Alvarez 2009). I will not try to settle here which is the correct alternative.…”

Section: Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Duty to Join Forces: When Individuals Lack Control

Hindriks

2019

The Monist

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Section: Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Duty to Join Forces: When Individuals Lack Control

Hindriks

2019

The Monist

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“…Some explicit or otherwise discussion or mention of this kind of objection can be found in at least the following places:Fischer (1982);Kane (1985);Kane (1996); McKenna (1997);Wyma (1997);Otsuka (1998); Fischer (1999a,b), andAlvarez (2009). But given the near-to-infinite literature on Frankfurt-type cases (see Fischer 1999a-ten pages of references in a ten-year-old article on 'recent work'!…”

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confidence: 94%

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

Nucci

2009

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent's actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt's famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt's own 'guidance' view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between 'not 8-ing' and 'avoiding 8-ing'.Keywords Frankfurt . Principle of alternate possibilities . Moral responsibility . Free will There is an apparently obvious, if relatively under-discussed 1 , objection to Frankfurt-type (1969, originally) counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (henceforth, the Principle). What's more, as we shall see, this objection is motivated by Frankfurt's own theory of action. The success of Frankfurt-type counterexamples depends, according to this Frankfurtian objection, on the agent's movements in the counterfactual scenario qualifying as her actions. The idea is that if in the counterfactual scenario what happens does not count as the relevant agent's actions (for example because what happens does not qualify as actions, or at least not as that agent's actions), then Frankfurt-type counterexamples fail. . But given the near-to-infinite literature on Frankfurt-type cases (see Fischer 1999a-ten pages of references in a ten-year-old article on 'recent work'!), I think it is fair to say that the objection in question has received relatively little attention.

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“…For myself, I am inclined to think that doing something intentionally requires the capacity to act otherwise, and have argued against Frankfurt's arguments elsewhere (see Alvarez, 2009). But perhaps we do not need to choose between these two positions here, as both agree that some degree of control is required.…”

Section: Doing Something Intentionallymentioning

confidence: 99%