ActionScript In-Lined Reference Monitoring in Prolog

Sridhar, Meera; Hamlen, Kevin W.

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11503-5_13

Cited by 11 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Though its bytecode language is type-safe, past malware has exploited VM buffer overflows [37], implemented cross-site-scripting attacks, and performed click-jacking [38,39] to damage browsers or disrupt victim host pages. The difficulty of enforcing rich AS security policies that prevent such attacks in web environments that are aggressively heterogeneous (e.g., composed of mash-ups that mix mobile code from many mutually distrusting sources) has led to application of IRM technologies to this challenging problem domain [9,[25][26][27][28]40].…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hippocratic binary instrumentation: First do no harm

Sridhar

Wartell²,

Hamlen

2014

Science of Computer Programming

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In-lined Reference Monitors (IRMs) cure binary software of security violations by instrumenting them with runtime security checks. Although over a decade of research has firmly established the power and versatility of the in-lining approach to security, its widespread adoption by industry remains impeded by concerns that in-lining may corrupt or otherwise harm intended, safe behaviors of the software it protects. Practitioners with such concerns are unwilling to adopt the technology despite its security benefits for fear that some software may break in ways that are hard to diagnose. This paper shows how recent approaches for machine-verifying the policy-compliance (soundness) of IRMs can be extended to also formally verify IRM preservation of policy-compliant behaviors (transparency). Feasibility of the approach is demonstrated through a transparency-checker implementation for Adobe ActionScript bytecode. The framework is applied to enforce security policies for Adobe Flash web advertisements and automatically verify that their policy-compliant behaviors are preserved.

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Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Numerous past works have developed powerful technologies for formally machine-verifying the soundness of IRMs [7,8,[25][26][27][28][29][30]. This is important for establishing high assurance, and for minimizing and stabilizing the trusted computing base (TCB) of IRM systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hippocratic binary instrumentation: First do no harm

Sridhar

Wartell²,

Hamlen

2014

Science of Computer Programming

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“…SPoX enforces policies expressible as security automata [3] and implements them by in-lining the automata into Java bytecode [22]. Related work has implemented IRM's for several other architectures, including the Microsoft .NET framework [20], ActionScript bytecode [33], and x86 assembly code [17]. The approach is also widely used for a variety of debugging purposes, such as for detecting race conditions [5].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disambiguating aspect-oriented security policies

Jones¹,

Hamlen²

2010

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Aspect-Oriented Software Development

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Many software security policies can be encoded as aspects that identify and guard security-relevant program operations. Bugs in these aspectually-implemented security policies often manifest as ambiguities in which aspects provide conflicting advice for a shared join point. The design and implementation of a detection algorithm for such ambiguities is presented and evaluated. The algorithm reduces advice conflict detection to a combination of boolean satisfiability, linear programming, and regular language non-emptiness. Case studies demonstrate that the analysis is useful for debugging aspect-oriented security policies for several existing aspectual security systems.

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“…Past case studies have demonstrated that such advice is extremely difficult to write correctly, especially when the policy is intended to apply to large classes of untrusted programs rather than individual applications [21]. Moreover, in many domains, such as web ad security, policy specifications change rapidly as new attacks and vulnerabilities are discovered (cf., [23,29,30]). Thus, the considerable effort that might be devoted to formally verifying one particular aspect implementation quickly becomes obsolete when the aspect is revised in response to a new threat.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cheko was inspired by our prior work on model-checking IRMs [30,29,9], but includes numerous substantial theoretic and pragmatic leaps beyond those earlier works. These include:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aspect-Oriented Runtime Monitor Certification

Hamlen

Jones

Sridhar

2012

Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems

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Abstract. In-lining runtime monitors into untrusted binary programs via aspect-weaving is an increasingly popular technique for efficiently and flexibly securing untrusted mobile code. However, the complexity of the monitor implementation and in-lining process in these frameworks can lead to vulnerabilities and low assurance for code-consumers. This paper presents a machine-verification technique for aspect-oriented inlined reference monitors based on abstract interpretation and modelchecking. Rather than relying upon trusted advice, the system verifies semantic properties expressed in a purely declarative policy specification language. Experiments on a variety of real-world policies and Java applications demonstrate that the approach is practical and effective.

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ActionScript In-Lined Reference Monitoring in Prolog

Cited by 11 publications

References 5 publications

Hippocratic binary instrumentation: First do no harm

Hippocratic binary instrumentation: First do no harm

Disambiguating aspect-oriented security policies

Aspect-Oriented Runtime Monitor Certification

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