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Abstract. In-lining runtime monitors into untrusted binary programs via aspect-weaving is an increasingly popular technique for efficiently and flexibly securing untrusted mobile code. However, the complexity of the monitor implementation and in-lining process in these frameworks can lead to vulnerabilities and low assurance for code-consumers. This paper presents a machine-verification technique for aspect-oriented inlined reference monitors based on abstract interpretation and modelchecking. Rather than relying upon trusted advice, the system verifies semantic properties expressed in a purely declarative policy specification language. Experiments on a variety of real-world policies and Java applications demonstrate that the approach is practical and effective.

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A prototype security policy verification system for ActionScript binaries is presented, whose implementation leverages recent advances in co-logic programming. Our experience with co-logic programming indicates that it is an extremely useful paradigm for elegantly expressing algorithms that lie at the heart of model-checking technologies. This results in an unusually small trusted computing base, making the verification system well-suited to frameworks like certifying in-lined reference monitoring systems, which require small, light-weight verifiers. Preliminary experiments and progress are discussed.