Active internalism and open dynamical systems

Yoshimi, Jeff

doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.569919

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Recent work on dynamic systems shows how this may be accomplished, with theoretically interesting results. Yoshimi ( 2012 ) identifies what he calls “active internalism” to describe open dynamical systems. In this view, the dynamics of the environment interact continually with dynamics that are intrinsic (or “internal”) to a cognitive system.…”

Section: Implications Of the Dynamic Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This produces a new landscape that is shaped by this active interaction. Yoshimi ( 2012 ) supplies some elegant examples of this in the realms of consciousness and phenomenology. The process of perspective-taking could make use of this same modeling strategy—task parameters may be explicitly modeled as part of the landscape of responses.…”

Section: Implications Of the Dynamic Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Interacting Timescales in Perspective-Taking

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Through theoretical discussion, literature review, and a computational model, this paper poses a challenge to the notion that perspective-taking involves a fixed architecture in which particular processes have priority. For example, some research suggests that egocentric perspectives can arise more quickly, with other perspectives (such as of task partners) emerging only secondarily. This theoretical dichotomy–between fast egocentric and slow other-centric processes–is challenged here. We propose a general view of perspective-taking as an emergent phenomenon governed by the interplay among cognitive mechanisms that accumulate information at different timescales. We first describe the pervasive relevance of perspective-taking to cognitive science. A dynamical systems model is then introduced that explicitly formulates the timescale interaction proposed. This model illustrates that, rather than having a rigid time course, perspective-taking can be fast or slow depending on factors such as task context. Implications are discussed, with ideas for future empirical research.

show abstract

Section: Implications Of the Dynamic Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implications Of the Dynamic Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interacting Timescales in Perspective-Taking

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There is now an impressive array of arguments for, and versions of, extended cognition (e.g., Clark 2008;Clark and Chalmers 1998;Gibbs 2001;Haugeland 1998;Hurley 2010;Hutchins 1995;Menary 2006;Noë 2004;Rockwell 2005;Rowlands 2003; Silberstein and Chemero 2011;Sutton 2010;Theiner 2011;van Gelder 1995;Wilson 2004), and these are being met by ever more articulated counterarguments, issuing from advocates of the internalist cognitive orthodoxy (e.g., Aizawa 2001, 2008;Block 2005;Grush 2003;Horgan and Kriegel 2008;O'Brien 1998;Preston 2010;Prinz 2006;Rupert 2004;Weiskopf 2008). Consonant with the nature of such long-standing controversies, there are also some voices urging pluralism and proclaiming the need to acknowledge the truth in each of the opposing parties (Yoshimi 2012). It is therefore not without some trepidation that one may venture to offer yet another contribution to this debate.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy

Shani

2012

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world-a conclusion which follows from a theory I develop in "Synergic Coordination: an argument for cognitive process externalism." Yet, in contradistinction with radical externalism, and in agreement with the internalist orthodoxy, MAE defends the view that mental states are situated invariably inside our heads. This is done, inter alia, by developing a novel hypothesis regarding the vehicles of content (in "Extended cognition without externalized mental states", and by criticizing arguments in support of mental states externalism (in "Reflections and objections"). The result, I believe, is a coherent theoretical alternative worthy of serious consideration.

show abstract

“…Nearby points in this space, according to some distance metric, are seen as representing similar conceptual states, allowing regions and manifolds within this space to capture more general concepts (Shepard 1987). The evolution of mental states over time becomes a trajectory in this vector space (Yoshimi 2012), driven by mechanistic cognitive processes (Churchland 1989). In general, the CVS approach has been very productive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implications of polychronous neuronal groups for the continuity of mind

Clair

Noelle

2015

Cogn Process

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Is conceptual space continuous? The answer to this question depends on how concepts are represented in the brain. Vector space representations, which ground conceptual states in the instantaneous firing rates of neurons, have successfully captured cognitive dynamics in a broad range of domains. There is a growing body of evidence, however, that conceptual information is encoded in spatiotemporal patterns of neural spikes, sometimes called polychronous neuronal groups (PNGs). The use of PNGs to represent conceptual states, rather than employing a continuous vector space, introduces new challenges, including issues of temporally extended representations, meaning through symbol grounding, compositionality, and representational similarity. In this article, we explore how PNGs support discontinuous transitions between concepts. While the continuous dynamics of vector space approaches require such transitions to activate intermediate and blended concepts, PNGs offer the means to change the activation of concepts discretely, introducing a form of conceptual dynamics unavailable to vector space models.

show abstract

Active internalism and open dynamical systems

Cited by 18 publications

References 45 publications

Interacting Timescales in Perspective-Taking

Interacting Timescales in Perspective-Taking

Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy

Implications of polychronous neuronal groups for the continuity of mind

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About