Actors, agenda, and appeal of the radical nationalist right in Slovakia

Gyárfášová, Oľga; Mesežnikov, Grigorij

doi:10.4324/9781315730578-11

Cited by 45 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Looking more concretely at movement parties of the far right, the Ľudová Strana – Naše Slovensko (ĽSNS, since 2015 known as Kotleba – Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko ) in Slovakia has mobilised on ‘Gypsy terror’ and ‘Roma criminality’, directly drawing upon the prior activities of the Slovenská Pospolitosť (SP) movement – with which the ĽSNS maintains direct ideological and organisational continuity (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov ; Milo ). Whilst serving a functional proactive component, this strategy also contributed to steal thunder to the more popular Slovenská Národná Strana (SNS), which in turn curbed the most contentious aspects of its nativist rhetoric under the leadership of Andrej Danko (Pirro ).…”

Section: Linkage Mechanisms: Insights Into the Contemporary Far‐rightmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ballots and barricades enhanced: far‐right ‘movement parties’ and movement‐electoral interactions

Pirro

2019

Nations and Nationalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Far‐right organisations offer an ideal common ground to bridge the scholarships on social movements and party politics. Indeed, they can be often interpreted as ‘movement parties’, i.e. hybrid collective actors spurring from the protest arena and translating social movement practices in the arena of party competition. This contribution enhances our understanding of the contemporary far right by focusing on the neglected links between movements and elections within the broader context of contention. The article assesses and refines propositions about such interactions through the adoption of a specific framework, ultimately showing that the Hungarian Jobbik consistently subscribed to the linkage mechanisms discussed.

show abstract

Section: Linkage Mechanisms: Insights Into the Contemporary Far‐rightmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ballots and barricades enhanced: far‐right ‘movement parties’ and movement‐electoral interactions

Pirro

2019

Nations and Nationalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As emphasized by Paul Warwick (1996), considerable parliamentary strength is a liability rather than an asset when it comes to prospective coalition partners’ chances of getting into office. Instead of large parties, the formateur party (henceforth the prime minister party) 2 tends – in order to maximize both its own influence and the working capacity of the coalition – to prefer medium-sized partners (see de Lange 2008 and, especially, Olsen et al 2010a) such as, for example, the Finnish Left Alliance (in coalition 1995–2003, see Dunphy 2010) or the Slovak National Party (in coalition 2006–10, see Gyárfašová and Mesežnikov 2015). Accordingly, my first expectation is: if the parliamentary strength of the radical right (left) party is moderate – that is, neither minuscule nor huge – the party will gain access to government .…”

Section: Radical Parties In Power: How Do They Get In?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regarding the radical right, previous research shows that political affinity between the radical right party and the prime minister party, especially on sociocultural issues, can open up possibilities for radical right government participation. In Poland (2005) and Slovakia (2006), for example, the prime minister parties (the conservative populist Law and Justice and the social democratic Direction, respectively) shared similar restrictive views on nationalism and xenophobia to their radical right coalition partners League of Polish Families and Slovak National Party (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015; Kasprowicz 2015). A similar pattern can be observed on the left.…”

Section: Radical Parties In Power: How Do They Get In?mentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do They Get In? Radical Parties and Government Participation in European Democracies

Fagerholm

2019

Gov. & oppos.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Despite their alleged anti-systemness and ‘non-coalitionability’, radical right and radical left parties have, since the early 1990s, both supported and entered coalition governments in a number of European liberal democracies. Using the classical ‘size and ideology’ framework, this study sets out to examine how – or, put differently, under what circumstances – radical right and radical left parties are able to overcome the obstacles associated with governing and enter coalition governments. Inspired by previous observations regarding the complex and multicausal nature of radical government participation, the study relies on a configurational method. By means of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of 37 radical parties at 207 coalition formation instances in 22 (Western and Central and Eastern) European countries, the article sheds light on different paths that lead to government inclusion (and exclusion) of radical actors. The empirical evidence indicates that electoral success in combination with a fairly similar policy position to a weak prime minister party is sufficient for government inclusion. The paths to government exclusion, by contrast, underline the importance of ideological distance in combination with size-related factors.

show abstract

“…This caused competing historical narratives, unfulfilled national aspirations while increasing the salience of ethnic or religious cleavages within these societies (Henderson, 2008; Hloušek and Kopeček, 2008; Minkenberg, 2010, 2015). In fact, as Minkenberg (2015: 41) argues, “[traditional and] new cleavages do not structure party competition in a stable fashion, except for the ethnic cleavage […].” The role of collective identities, especially ethnic ones, has been central to understanding party competition in CEE and “the subject of dozens of studies analysing transitional developments in post-communist countries” (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2015: 224). Thus, historical grievances and imagined or genuine national traumas continue to serve as sociocultural sources of political contestation (Minkenberg, 2015: 27–42).…”

Section: Conceptualizing Radical Right Fringe Parties and Party Compementioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of radical right fringe parties on main parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Empirical evidence from manifesto data

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Do radical right fringe parties affect main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? Using data from the Manifesto Project, we analyze the relationship between radical right fringe parties' and main parties' policy programs regarding sociocultural issues in six post-communist countries of CEE. Even though radical right fringe parties have participated in government in several of these countries, and in Hungary a fringe party has become the country's second largest party, our analysis shows that the sociocultural issues in radical right fringe party manifestos do not systematically relate to the changes in main party manifestos regarding those issues. Even if some of the main parties in our study might often agree with the radical right fringe parties, our analysis shows that the latter do not directly influence the policy priorities of the main parties.

show abstract

Actors, agenda, and appeal of the radical nationalist right in Slovakia

Cited by 45 publications

References 0 publications

Ballots and barricades enhanced: far‐right ‘movement parties’ and movement‐electoral interactions

Ballots and barricades enhanced: far‐right ‘movement parties’ and movement‐electoral interactions

How Do They Get In? Radical Parties and Government Participation in European Democracies

The effect of radical right fringe parties on main parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Empirical evidence from manifesto data

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About