Adaptation to Climate Change: How Does Heterogeneity in Adaptation Costs Affect Climate Coalitions?

Marrouch, Walid; Lazkano, Itziar; Nkuiya, Bruno

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2444981

Cited by 8 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…We know that developed countries have a higher gross domestic product per capita and consequently are more susceptible to being damaged, but at the same time these countries have much larger financial and technological means than developing countries to adapt to climate change and lessen its impact. Our assumption is in line with the nascent literature considering not only mitigation when designing an IEA, but also adaptation efforts that aim at reducing the damage cost (see, for example, Benchekroun and Taherkhani, ; Breton and Sbragia, , ; Benchekroun et al., ; Lazkano et al., ; Masoudi and Zaccour, ).…”

Section: The Modelsupporting

confidence: 74%

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

Sacco

Zaccour

2018

Int Trans Operational Res

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We analyze the impact of social externalities (SEs) on the stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA). We consider a framework in which players are divided into two homogeneous groups, namely, developed and developing countries. We assume that members of an IEA get some additional benefits, to which we refer as SEs. One main result is that any coalition that is internally stable will expand to include all countries, which is related to the minimum participation clause considered in some papers. However, our minimum, which is endogenously defined, is not the largest stable coalition size, but the grand coalition.

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Section: The Modelsupporting

confidence: 74%

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

Sacco

Zaccour

2018

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Moreover, in the emission-game equilibrium, signatories mitigate N times more than non signatories for the same level of vulnerability. Replacing in (11) the corresponding expressions, 12 we then have…”

Section: C-agreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With respect to our first contribution, other publications that have considered the effects of adaptive investments on membership in IEAs include Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2011), Masoudi & Zaccour (2016), Lazkano et al (2016), Masoudi & Zaccour (2017), Benchekroun et al (2017), and Bayramoglu et al (2018). With the exception of Masoudi & Zaccour (2017), all assume that adaptive measures are decided simultaneously with mitigation decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bayramoglu et al (2018) assumes that adaptation contributes to the welfare both directly and in relation to the level of total emissions; the authors show that in that case adaptation can make countries' mitigation levels strategic complements and this allows countries to form larger stable agreements. Lazkano et al (2016) studies the stability of an IEA in a generic model where countries are assumed to be asymmetric in adaptation cost parameters. The authors show that when the environmental damage cost is linear, asymmetry does not change the standard small-size coalition result for stable IEAs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Breton

Sbragia

2019

Environ Resource Econ

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We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses pertaining to both adaptation and mitigation measures. We assume that adaptation requires a prior irreversible investment and presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing a country's vulnerability to the impact of pollution, while mitigation policies produce a public good by reducing the total amount of pollution. Using a stylized model, we show that adaptive measures can be used strategically and that their inclusion in environmental agreements enhances agreement stability and can even lead to full cooperation. We examine the robustness of agreements including both adaptation and mitigation measures against renegotiation. Finally, we evaluate how including adaptive measures for climate change in international environmental agreements affects welfare and overall pollution.

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“…Additionally, Nkuiya [2012], Nkuiya et al [2015] and Miller and Nkuiya [2016] investigate voluntary participation in climate treaties, also including the possibility of a sudden regime shift using both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Moreover, Lazkano et al [2016] study how adaptations of costs influence the decision of developed and developing countries to join international agreements. Furthermore, there is much research done about the influence of dominant players on the pollution behavior of weaker players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Agent-Based Models of Sex, Plants and Sustainability

Schüller¹

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Adaptation to Climate Change: How Does Heterogeneity in Adaptation Costs Affect Climate Coalitions?

Cited by 8 publications

References 31 publications

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

On Agent-Based Models of Sex, Plants and Sustainability

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