Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis

Huber, Joel; Payne, John W.; Puto, Christopher P.

doi:10.1086/208899

Cited by 1,659 publications

(1,493 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…These effects are robust and have been replicated with many different types of decoys and stimulus materials, demonstrating violations of normative choice principles (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995;Dhar & Glazer, 1996;Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982;Huber & Puto, 1983;Simonson, 1989;Wedell, 1991;Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). They have also been found to affect real-world consumer purchasing, such as decisions to purchase products in supermarket settings (Doyle, O'Connor, Reynolds, & Bottomley, 1999).…”

Section: Fig 1 Placements Of Compromise (C a )mentioning

confidence: 80%

Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects across Judgment and Choice

Pettibone

Wedell

2000

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

164

168

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Three experiments explored cognitive models of inferior, compromise, and phantom decoy effects in both judgment and choice. Participants made judgments of attractiveness, justifiability, and evaluation anxiety associated with each alternative in the set, along with judgments of the attractiveness of each alternative's dimensional values. In another session, they also chose the alternative they most preferred. Results were analyzed in terms of the degree to which decoy effects reflected shifts in dimensional values or reflected emergent values based on relationships with other alternatives in the set. Both emergent-value and value-shift models of inferior decoy effects were supported, but only the emergent-value model of compromise decoy effects was supported. Results for the phantom decoy indicated that this effect was choice-based and did not occur in judgment. Thus, although decoy effects were largely similar in choice and judgment, they also differed in important ways. ᭧

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Section: Fig 1 Placements Of Compromise (C a )mentioning

confidence: 80%

Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects across Judgment and Choice

Pettibone

Wedell

2000

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

164

168

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“…As a consequence of the introduction of C, the probability of choosing the similar A decreases much more than that of choosing the dissimilar B (Huber et al, 1982). The similarity effect explains why a company that is planning to launch a new product on the market tries to differentiate it from those already present to minimize "cannibalization" (Heath and Chatterjee, 1995).…”

Section: Comparative Mate Choice and Rationality In Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike C, in fact, D is inferior to and is dominated by A (but not by B) in both the attributes. The "attraction effect" predicts that when D is added to the control choice set, the probability of choosing A increases and that of choosing B decreases, thus violating both the regularity and the IIA conditions (Huber et al, 1982). Since irrational choice has been observed in human economic decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and in experiments of animal foraging (Bateson et al, 2003;Shafir, 1994), researchers have recently asked if females show irrational mating decisions as well Healy, 2005, Kirkpatrick et al, 2006).…”

Section: Comparative Mate Choice and Rationality In Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational mate choice: Theory and empirical evidence

Castellano

Cadeddu

Cermelli

2012

Behavioural Processes

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a b s t r a c tThe present review is based on the thesis that mate choice results from information-processing mechanisms governed by computational rules and that, to understand how females choose their mates, we should identify which are the sources of information and how they are used to make decisions. We describe mate choice as a three-step computational process and for each step we present theories and review empirical evidence. The first step is a perceptual process. It describes the acquisition of evidence, that is, how females use multiple cues and signals to assign an attractiveness value to prospective mates (the preference function hypothesis). The second step is a decisional process. It describes the construction of the decision variable (DV), which integrates evidence (private information by direct assessment), priors (public information), and value (perceived utility) of prospective mates into a quantity that is used by a decision rule (DR) to produce a choice. We make the assumption that females are optimal Bayesian decision makers and we derive a formal model of DV that can explain the effects of preference functions, mate copying, social context, and females' state and condition on the patterns of mate choice. The third step of mating decision is a deliberative process that depends on the DRs. We identify two main categories of DRs (absolute and comparative rules), and review the normative models of mate sampling tactics associated to them. We highlight the limits of the normative approach and present a class of computational models (sequential-sampling models) that are based on the assumption that DVs accumulate noisy evidence over time until a decision threshold is reached. These models force us to rethink the dichotomy between comparative and absolute decision rules, between discrimination and recognition, and even between rational and irrational choice. Since they have a robust biological basis, we think they may represent a useful theoretical tool for behavioural ecologist interested in integrating proximate and ultimate causes of mate choice.

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“…Take, for example, the well-known decoy effect, in which one's preferences among two items shift when a third item is introduced, even though one has no desire to choose the third item. Yet that weaker item, which is dominated in comparison to either of the two other choices, changes how one feels about those two other choices (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). For example, if offered the choice between front-row seats to a concert for $200 or 50th-row seats for $100, you may see both options as equally appealing.…”

Section: Biases and Context Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Err Is (Not Only) Human: Fallibility as a Window Into Primate Cognition

Beran¹

2017

CCBR

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Human cognition affords our species an excellent toolbox for solving problems. Many nonhuman animal species appear to share with humans some of these tools. However, human cognition also is fallible. Susceptibility to perceptual illusions, misrepresentation of probabilities, cognitive biases, faulty memory, and heuristics all present sources of error from which behavior is suboptimal in the pursuit of goals. Some nonhuman species share these perceptual and cognitive biases with humans. Examples of this are described for nonhuman primates, ranging from perceptual illusions to humanlike failures on games of probability such as the Monty Hall Problem. Sometimes the performances of nonhuman primates mirror those of humans, but there are exceptions. Given that other species do experience things erroneously and make errors in judgment, it is an exciting question of whether they also might generate any strategies to offset their fallibility. Two examples to suggest that they do are provided from research with chimpanzees. One is of strategic self-distraction in the face of tempting rewards in a delay of gratification task. The other is of information-seeking behaviors in different contexts where chimpanzees have different types of information. This research, and that of many other groups, shows the value of examining perceptual and cognitive errors across species, and how different individuals and different species may be equipped psychologically to deal with the possibility of these errors occurring. Keywords: primate cognition, perception, illusions, self-control, metacognition IntroductionThe 20th century saw a shift in how humans thought about nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals), their behavior, and the cognitive processes that might underlie their behavior. Comparative cognition emerged as a strong discipline in the second half of the century, largely as a result of the broader cognitive revolution in human psychology, continued developments in ethology, and new opportunities to study a diverse range of species (Shettleworth, 2010). Earlier comparative psychologists certainly took an interest in aspects of cognition (see Dewsbury, 1984Dewsbury, , 2000Dewsbury, , 2013, but researchers in the second half of the century provided new approaches to understanding animal minds. Initially these approaches focused largely on traditional aspects of human cognitive psychology, including memory, perceptual capacities, and learning phenomenon (e.g., Honig & Fetterman, 1992;Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1978;Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984), as they might reflect the use of mental representations and other information-processing approaches for interacting with the world. Later, 58COMPARATIVE COGNITION & BEHAVIOR REVIEWS Beran research increasingly focused on questions that covered nearly every topic found in a human cognitive psychology textbook, and even questions that were not typically discussed in such sources (e.g., theory of mind, deception, mind reading, cooperative decision making, metacognition, mental time travel, and ot...

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Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis

Cited by 1,659 publications

References 24 publications

Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects across Judgment and Choice

Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects across Judgment and Choice

Computational mate choice: Theory and empirical evidence

To Err Is (Not Only) Human: Fallibility as a Window Into Primate Cognition

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