Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects across Judgment and Choice

Abstract

Three experiments explored cognitive models of inferior, compromise, and phantom decoy effects in both judgment and choice. Participants made judgments of attractiveness, justifiability, and evaluation anxiety associated with each alternative in the set, along with judgments of the attractiveness of each alternative's dimensional values. In another session, they also chose the alternative they most preferred. Results were analyzed in terms of the degree to which decoy effects reflected shifts in dimensional values or reflected emergent values based on relationships with other alternatives in the set. Both emergent-value and value-shift models of inferior decoy effects were supported, but only the emergent-value model of compromise decoy effects was supported. Results for the phantom decoy indicated that this effect was choice-based and did not occur in judgment. Thus, although decoy effects were largely similar in choice and judgment, they also differed in important ways. ᭧

Regret aversion in reason-based choice

“…Research suggests that individuals are highly concerned with the justifiability of their decisions (Montgomery, 1983;Pettibone & Wedell, 2000;Simonson, 1989;Slovic, 1975;Tversky, 1972). This desire for decision justifiability can lead to violations of fundamental principles of rational decision making, such as procedural invariance and regularity, and, thus, to biased choices, as illustrated by the reason-based choice effects literature Simonson, 1989).…”

“…Several authors (Montgomery, 1983;Pettibone & Wedell, 2000;Simonson, 1989;Slovic, 1975;Tversky, 1972) have written about how the reasons and justifications the decision maker sees for and against the available alternatives influence decision making. Interestingly, the desire to make justifiable decisions can sometimes lead to choices that violate the norms of rational decision making (Barber, Heath, & Odean, 2003;Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982;Simonson, 1989).…”

“…There is evidence that justifiability perceptions mediate experimentally induced RBCEs (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000). Simonson (1989) found stronger RBCEs when decision makers expected to be asked to justify their decisions to others (cf.…”

Similarity and attraction effects in episodic memory judgments

“…Our study raises the possibility that other effects identified in the decision-making literature could also be extended to judgments about episodic memories. For example, in the compromise effect (e.g., Pettibone & Wedell, 2000;Simonson, 1989), a third option, E, representing a compromise between A and B (e.g., a mid-priced flight requiring two stops for the case in the Introduction) can be preferred in the ternary choice (ABE) even when it is not preferred in either binary choice (AE or BE). An interaction between the two processes of attention-switching and lateral inhibition can explain the compromise effect (see Roe et al, 2001).…”

To Err Is (Not Only) Human: Fallibility as a Window Into Primate Cognition

“…However, if you then were offered the choice of 50th-row seats for $150, not only would you reject that choice immediately but you may see the $100 tickets for the 50th row as a better choice than the front-row seats. Decoy effects have been documented in situations where human consumers evaluate products (e.g., Pettibone & Wedell, 2000;Wedell, 1991) and evaluate mate choices (Sedikides, Ariely, & Olsen, 1999). There is also evidence that animals may be affected by decoy stimuli (e.g., honeybees : Shafir, Waite, & Smith, 2002;hummingbirds: Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2002;Hurly & Oseen, 1999;starlings: Bateson, 2002;Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, & Kacelnik, 2004;cats: Scarpi, 2011).…”