Decision research has only recently started to take seriously the role of emotions in choices and decisions. Regret is the emotion that has received the most attention. In this article, we sample a number of the initial regret studies from psychology and economics, and trace some of the complexities and contradictions to which they led. We then sketch a new theory, decision justification theory (DJT), which synthesizes several apparently conflicting findings. DJT postulates two core components of decision–related regret, one associated with the (comparative) evaluation of the outcome, the other with the feeling of self–blame for having made a poor choice. We reinterpret several existing studies in DJT terms. We then report some new studies that directly tested (and support) DJT, and propose a number of research issues that follow from this new approach to regret.

A laboratory experiment was used to evaluate the effects of anonymity and evaluative tone on computer-mediated groups using a group decision support system to perform an idea-generation task. Evaluative tone was manipulated through a confederate group member who entered supportive or critical comments into the automated brainstorming system. Groups working anonymously and with a critical confederate produced the greatest number of original solutions and overall comments, yet average solution quality per item and average solution rarity were not different across conditions. Identified groups working with a supportive confederate were the most satisfied and had the highest levels of perceived effectiveness, but produced the fewest original solutions and overall comments.anonymity, evaluative tone, group problem solving, group decision support system, electronic meeting system

Current approaches to organizational effectiveness are conceptually conflicting and empiricaiiy arid. They appear handicapped by a desire to produce a single effectiveness statement about any given organization. We propose a "multipie-constituency" approach to avoid this requirement, explicitiy assuming that an organization's different constituencies will form different assessments of its effectiveness. We aiso suggest several conceptuai and empiricai implications of this reorientation.This paper attempts to define a broad perspective on organizational effectiveness that encompasses rather than conflicts with existing perspectives. The proposed perspective will not attempt to prescribe research directions or methodology. Rather, it will attempt to define areas of convergent theorizing and rich empirical domains.

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Specific, difficult goals enhance performance in many tasks. We hypothesize, however, that this effect disappears or reverses for novel tasks that allow multiple alternative strategies. We report findings from three laboratory experiments using a stock market prediction task with these characteristics. In the first study, 34 students made predictions concerning the value of 100 companies' stock based on three manipulated cues after receiving either a "do your best" or a specific, difficult goal (come within $10 of the actual stock price) concerning the accuracy of their predictions. In the second study, 88 students making stock market predictions received one of the following goals: do your best, specific-easy (come within $30), specific-moderate (come within $20), specific-hard (come within $ 10), or a tapering, specific goal (decreasing from $30 to $ 10 in $5 increments every 20 predictions). Finally, the third study (n = 30) replicated the first study by using a different prediction algorithm for the stock market simulation. The results of repeated measures multivariate analyses of variance conducted on indexes of prediction accuracy and predictor weightings supported the hypothesis that specific, difficult goals (prediction accuracy) increase an individual's strategy search activity and reduce prediction accuracy for the stock predictions.After nearly two decades of research, goal setting has become established as one of the most consistent and successful models of work performance. Tests of the goal setting model have been numerous and have consistently demonstrated support for the basic proposition that specific and difficult goals, if accepted, lead to higher levels of performance than general or "do your best" goals (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). This basic finding has been demonstrated in both laboratory and field settings and for a wide variety of participants and tasks.Despite the consistent success of goal setting, it seems likely that there are boundaries beyond which goal setting will not work or may even be harmful. For instance, Huber (1985) has argued that, for complex or heuristic tasks, goals may be dysfunctional because they may serve to misdirect an individual's attention (Sommer & Pearce, 1986). Huber found that individuals performing a heuristic maze task were less effective if they had a specific, difficult rather than a general goal for how quickly to find their way out of a computer maze. (It is interesting to note that Huber imposed a 10-s penalty for individuals who used a "peeking option." Excessive use of this option resulted in an accumulation of time penalties. Huber reported that individuals having the specific time goal were much more inclined to overuse the peeking option.) In their goal-settingexpectancy hybrid model of motivation, Dachler and Mobley (1973) included job experience as a boundary condition for goalWe would like to thank C. Lee for her helpful comments on an earlier , Arizona 85721.setting, reflecting their finding that goal setting had a more powerful effe...