Adding Conditional Superannuation to the Antidoping Policy Mix

Abstract

This article introduces and then examines a novel antidoping policy mechanism, based upon a conditional superannuation fund for professional athletes. It begins by presenting a theoretical case in favor of the scheme relative to the background of current policy. Consideration is given to the utility and benefits of a conditional superannuation mechanism to augment existing antidoping policy structures. The case is developed using results from a pilot experimental economics study testing the policy proposal, which suggests that the conditional superannuation mechanism has the potential to outperform existing measures, such as fines and bans. This article offers a policy variation that could supplement the existing arrangements as a contiguous mechanism. While no single policy intervention seems plausible in fully eliminating sport doping, a combination of incentive and punitive mechanisms may yield a superior policy mix to help attenuate doping’s prevalence in elite sport. The evidence presented here within the antidoping policy context may also recommend the utility of conditional superannuation as a mechanism to address other enduring challenges in sport, such as violence, gambling, and behavioral transgressions.

Whose job is it anyway? A qualitative investigation into the influence of agents, race organisers, and sponsors on the risk of doping in elite distance running

“…Rule 15 of the World Athletics anti-doping rules now states that athletes must have been subject to at least three out of competition tests in the lead up to major events (e.g., Olympics or World Championships), and currently only applies to athletes from Belarus, Bahrain, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Ukraine. These regulations may bring some rigour to distance running at the elite international level, but they will not affect doping in East African countries at the national level (Chebet, 2014;Lenten et al, 2017) where athletes not only compete for the medals and national pride, but for professional race opportunities and sponsorship deals (Ogama & Sakwa, 2019). On the corporate side, there are measures currently adopted by several of the main sponsors of distance runners that produce a financial disincentive to doping, such as the policy not to work with athletes who have previously served a doping suspension.…”

“…This could be significant, since previous research suggests that financial sanctions are a greater deterrent to doping than a ban from sport (Overbye et al, 2015;Westmattelmann et al, 2018;. Lenten and colleagues go even further when they propose a conditional superannuation scheme for tackling doping (Lenten & Smith, 2020, Lenten et al, 2017 If there were a significant stock market reaction each time a doping case were reported, that would unequivocally induce a reaction from a big corporation. It is hypothesised in a recent review on corporate misconduct (Carberry et al, 2018) that investors are more likely to react negatively when the media presents clear and credible information that the company was in some way responsible for the misconduct, and that the misconduct was the result of deeper organisational problems.…”