Using the Panama Papers, we show that the beginning of media reporting on expropriations and property confiscations in a country increases the probability that offshore entities are incorporated by agents from the same country in the same month. This result is robust to the use of country-year fixed effects and the exclusion of tax havens. Further analysis shows that the effect is driven by countries with non-corrupt and effective governments, which supports the notion that offshore entities are incorporated when reasonably well-intended and well-functioning governments become more serious about fighting organized crime by confiscating proceeds of crime.

PERMISSIONShttps://www.springer.com/gp/open-access/publication-policies/self-archiving-policy Self-archiving for articles in subscription-based journalsSpringer journals' policy on preprint sharing.By signing the Copyright Transfer Statement you still retain substantial rights, such as self-archiving:

This article introduces and then examines a novel antidoping policy mechanism, based upon a conditional superannuation fund for professional athletes. It begins by presenting a theoretical case in favor of the scheme relative to the background of current policy. Consideration is given to the utility and benefits of a conditional superannuation mechanism to augment existing antidoping policy structures. The case is developed using results from a pilot experimental economics study testing the policy proposal, which suggests that the conditional superannuation mechanism has the potential to outperform existing measures, such as fines and bans. This article offers a policy variation that could supplement the existing arrangements as a contiguous mechanism. While no single policy intervention seems plausible in fully eliminating sport doping, a combination of incentive and punitive mechanisms may yield a superior policy mix to help attenuate doping’s prevalence in elite sport. The evidence presented here within the antidoping policy context may also recommend the utility of conditional superannuation as a mechanism to address other enduring challenges in sport, such as violence, gambling, and behavioral transgressions.

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships; and (3) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners. Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction of relatively large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare.

No abstract