Aesthetic experience: Marcel Proust and the neo-Jamesian structure of awareness

Galin, David

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2003.12.002

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Art as order and "further order" From a neuro-scientific standpoint, David Galin concurs with the Jamesian category recovery project (Galin 1993(Galin , 1994(Galin , 1999(Galin , 2004 but does not endorse the two distinct forms of phenomenal contents transporting different types of qualitative information in the interpretation of Proustian art. In his opinion (Galin 2004) the Recherche includes experiences which differ in terms of content, not type; they could be graded with the more abundant or pre-eminent fringe content of involuntary memories 19 .…”

Section: Application Of Fringe Experience To Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 80%

“…In his opinion (Galin 2004) the Recherche includes experiences which differ in terms of content, not type; they could be graded with the more abundant or pre-eminent fringe content of involuntary memories 19 . In addition, unlike Mangan, he does not propose linking aesthetic experience to meaningfulness, which he sees as "a purpose-oriented research"; on the contrary, he endorses … tradition viewing "detachment" and "disinterest" as a pre-condition for aesthetic experience.…”

Section: Application Of Fringe Experience To Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Art as a metaphor of the mind

Lavazza¹

2008

Phenom Cogn Sci

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This paper focuses on the emergent neo-Jamesian perspective concerning the phenomenology of art and aesthetic experience. Starting from the distinction between nucleus and fringe in the stream of thought described by William James, it can be argued that our appreciation of a work of art is guided by a vague and blurred perception of a much more powerful content, of which we are not fully aware. Accordingly, a work of art is seen as a kind of metaphor of our mental life, objectified to be able to reach out to a much larger audience. However, it is a "realistic" theory rooted in evolutionary psychology, which claims that our mind developed within a framework shaped by environmental pressures. The aesthetics illustrated by several novelists develops a paradigm for this theory. The search for the neuronal correlates of stream of consciousness allows to make a comparison with the recent findings of neuroaesthetics and to reject its claim that it is unnecessary to take phenomenology and psychology into account.

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Section: Application Of Fringe Experience To Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Application Of Fringe Experience To Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Art as a metaphor of the mind

Lavazza¹

2008

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Narration, Navigation, and Non-Conscious Thought: Neuroscientific and Literary Approaches to the Thinking Body

Cuddy-Keane¹

2010

University of Toronto Quarterly

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Why cyborgs necessarily feel

Gärtner

2022

Technoetic Arts

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In this article, I argue for an essentialist account of cyborgs. This means that one condition for being a cyborg is to possess phenomenal consciousness, ‘what it feels like’ to undergo an experience. In this context, I make two related claims: (1) the metaphysical claim that it is essential to cyborgs to have phenomenal consciousness due to their being augmented human beings, and (2) the related claim that this metaphysical constraint need not apply to cyborg-like entities, which may or may not be augmented humans and so might not possess phenomenal consciousness. In support of these claims, I argue that cyborgs without phenomenal consciousness would lose information-processing abilities essential to the human condition and would be better understood as androids with biological body parts. First, I briefly characterize phenomenal consciousness in the context of the Mind‐Body Problem. Then I introduce the Mind‐Technology Problem and claim that it is better suited to frame the relevant discussion. In a second step, I argue that phenomenal consciousness is a vital feature of the human mind as it is fundamental for practices that relate what it feels to have an experience to other minds capable of such experiences, as in the arts. Briefly, thus, I argue that, without phenomenal consciousness, there is no art, and that art involves information-processing abilities essential to the human condition. Then I describe two different kinds of entity that might be considered cyborgs in the context of enhancement, distinguishing between cyborgs and cyborg-like entities. Finally, I argue that entities that do not possess phenomenal consciousness cannot be classified as cyborgs, since without it, an essential capacity of human experience, to be affected by the expressive arts, is absent.

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Aesthetic experience: Marcel Proust and the neo-Jamesian structure of awareness

Cited by 4 publications

References 19 publications

Art as a metaphor of the mind

Art as a metaphor of the mind

Narration, Navigation, and Non-Conscious Thought: Neuroscientific and Literary Approaches to the Thinking Body

Why cyborgs necessarily feel

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