Schattschneider's insight that "policies make politics" has played an influential role in the modern study of political institutions and public policy. Yet if policies do indeed make politics, rational politicians clearly have opportunities to use policies to create a future structure of politics more to their own advantage-and this strategic dimension has gone almost entirely unexplored. Do politicians actually use policies to make politics? Under what conditions? In this paper, we develop a theoretical argument about what can be expected from strategic politicians, and we carry out an empirical analysis on a policy development that is particularly instructive: the adoption of public sector collective bargaining laws by the states during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s-laws that fueled the rise of public sector unions, and "made politics" to the great advantage of Democrats over Republicans. 1 In his classic study of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, Schattschneider (1935) famously argued that policies make their own politics. Scholars in American political development, public policy, and comparative politics have since brought this notion to the theoretical center of their work and have provided considerable evidence that he was right (Hacker and Pierson, 2014).The adoption of Social Security, for example, created a constituency of senior citizens so supportive of the program that it became politically untouchable (Campbell, 2003). The adoption of airline deregulation led to a restructuring of the airline industry that transformed the interests of the major players, giving them incentives to support a deregulated system that most had initially opposed (Patashnik, 2008). The adoption of welfare state policies of various kinds throughout the developed world generated new mass constituencies that powerfully resisted when governments tried to cut back on programs and benefits (Pierson, 1994).Policies shape politics whether anyone intends for it to happen or not. When a new program is created, so are new constituencies and new interests-and new politics-and in the literature, this built-in phenomenon has played a key role, via the concept of policy feedback, in scholarly explanations of the politics of public policy (e.g, Pierson, 1993;Mettler and Soss, 2004).But while significant progress has been made, an important dimension of inquiry has gone unexplored. For if policies make their own politics, strategic politicians would surely want to anticipate that and take advantage of it. They would want to use policy to shape the future structure of politics and power to their own benefit. In doing so, moreover, they are not limited to simply trying to enhance or fine-tune the feedback effects highlighted in the literature, in which a policy gives rise to political consequences that (often) bolster support for the policy itself. The strategic opportunities for politicians are much broader than that, and potentially far And what can that tell us about why particular policies get adopted, why they get designed in sp...